

**PROCEEDINGS AT HEARING
OF
MARCH 2, 2021**

COMMISSIONER AUSTIN F. CULLEN

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March 2, 2021
(Via Videoconference)

(PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT 8:30 A.M.)

THE REGISTRAR: Good morning. The hearing is now resumed. Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
Yes, Ms. Rose.

MS. ROSE: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
Mr. Commissioner, we have two panels of witnesses appearing before you here today. The first is a panel members from Deloitte/Quantexa, and I'll be conducting the examination of this panel, and then later on you will have Ms. Patel conducting an examination of a Mr. Brad Rudnicki, associated with BCLC.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

MS. ROSE: So we have four members of our panel today, and I will propose to go through their backgrounds in an alphabetical order.

So if we could start with you, Mr. Bell.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think before we get started, Ms. Rose, we may wish to have the witnesses affirmed or sworn.

MS. ROSE: We may. That may be of some assistance, yes. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

1 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Yes.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Witnesses please unmute yourself.

3 And Mr. Stewart. Thank you.

4 Would each of you please state your full
5 name and spell your first and last name for the
6 record. Let's start with Mr. Bell.

7 A (AB) Sorry, I couldn't hear the first bit.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Oh. Would each of you please state
9 your full name and spell your first name and
10 last name for the record.

11 A (AB) Yeah. Alexon Bell, A-l-e-x-o-n B-e-l-l.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And Mr. Dent.

13 A (PD) Peter Dent, P-e-t-e-r D-e-n-t.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. Ms. Dewitt.

15 A (BD) Beth Dewitt, B-e-t-h D-e-w-i-t-t.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And Mr. Stewart.

17 A (DS) David Stewart, D-a-v-i-d S-t-e-w-a-r-t.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you.

19 **ALEXON BELL, a witness**
20 **called for the**
21 **commission, affirmed.**

22 **PETER DENT, a witness**
23 **called for the**
24 **commission, affirmed.**

25 **BETH DEWITT, a witness**

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1 called for the
2 commission, affirmed.
3 DAVID STEWART, a witness
4 called for the
5 commission, affirmed.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you.

7 MS. ROSE: Thank you, Madam Registrar. And apologies
8 for my oversight this morning.

9 Madam Registrar, if we could please have
10 Mr. Alexon Bell's CV on the screen.

11 **EXAMINATION BY MS. ROSE:**

12 Q Mr. Bell, do you recognize this document as a CV
13 that you've provided to the commission?

14 A (AB) I do.

15 Q And you are a co-founder of Quantexa?

16 A (AB) I am, yes.

17 Q And that's the software we will see demonstrated
18 later on today, I understand.

19 A (AB) It is indeed.

20 Q You have 20 years of experience in building
21 software for the purpose of detecting financial
22 crime?

23 A (AB) That's correct.

24 Q You've assisted financial institutions and
25 non-financial institutions investigate financial

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1 crime as well as other crimes such as wildlife
2 trafficking, human trafficking, bribery and
3 corruption?

4 A (AB) I have, yes.

5 Q And you have received ACAMS training?

6 A (AB) I have, yes.

7 Q Are you currently based in the UK?

8 A (AB) I am, yes, in London.

9 MS. ROSE: Mr. Commissioner, I would ask that we have
10 Mr. Bell's CV marked as the next exhibit.

11 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, very well. That will be 664.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 664.

13 **EXHIBIT 664: Biography of Alexon Bell**

14 MS. ROSE: Madam Registrar, if we could briefly turn
15 to Mr. Dent's CV, please.

16 Q Mr. Dent, you recognize this CV as the document
17 you've provided to the commission?

18 A (PD) I do.

19 Q And, Mr. Dent, you've testified for the
20 commission once before on November 30th, 2020?

21 A (PD) That is correct.

22 Q You're a partner at Deloitte's forensic practice
23 with over 25 years' experience in the financial
24 crime area?

25 A (PD) Yes, that's correct.

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1 MS. ROSE: So, Mr. Commissioner, I would ask we have
2 this CV marked as exhibit 665.

3 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Would we be
4 duplicating? Has this already been marked in
5 Mr. Dent's last appearance? Not that it
6 matters. I don't think one duplication is going
7 to throw a wrench into our recordkeeping.

8 MS. ROSE: Apologies, Mr. Commissioner. I'm
9 receiving word that it was marked previously, so
10 we don't need to mark it again.

11 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you.

12 MS. ROSE: Madam Registrar, could we please move to
13 Ms. Dewitt's CV, please.

14 Q So, Ms. Dewitt, you are a partner of Cyber Risk
15 Advisory group in Deloitte in Toronto?

16 A (BD) I am.

17 Q And you have 15 years' experience designing
18 privacy and data protection strategies and
19 programs?

20 A (BD) I do.

21 Q And you're experienced in privacy rules and
22 regulations across Canada?

23 A (BD) I am.

24 Q And you're also experienced in pattern detection
25 and financial crime analytics?

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1 A (BD) I am.

2 Q And you've used these approaches for clients in
3 the past?

4 A (BD) We have.

5 Q And do you recognize the CV as your CV?

6 A I do.

7 MS. ROSE: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Perhaps we
8 could have this marked as exhibit 665.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: Very well.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 665.

12 **EXHIBIT 665: Biography of Beth Dewitt**

13 MS. ROSE: And my colleague is assisting me with the
14 reference point for Mr. Dent's biography, which
15 is indexed at exhibit 279. Madam Registrar,
16 could we please have Mr. Stewart's CV.

17 Q Mr. Stewart, do you recognize this as your CV?

18 A (DS) I do.

19 Q And you are a partner of the financial crime
20 practice group of Deloitte in Toronto?

21 A (DS) I am.

22 Q And you have experience conducting
23 investigations, including white collar crime
24 investigation such as fraud?

25 A (DS) I am.

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1 Q And you have experience assisting clients with
2 pattern detection and financial crime analytics?

3 A (DS) That is correct.

4 MS. ROSE: Okay. Madam Registrar --

5 Mr. Commissioner, I should say, I would ask that
6 we have this marked as the next exhibit, please.

7 THE COMMISSIONER: Very well. 666.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 666.

9 **EXHIBIT 666: Biography of David Stewart**

10 MS. ROSE: And I'd like to move now to the
11 presentation that was provided to the commission
12 by these panel members, Madam Registrar. Thank
13 you.

14 Q And I'm not sure who the best member of the
15 panel is to speak to this, but is this a
16 document that one of you has prepared?

17 A (PD) It is a document that we prepared
18 collectively as a group.

19 MS. ROSE: Okay. And first, just so that I don't
20 forget, I'd first like to mark this as
21 exhibit 667.

22 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, very well.

23 THE REGISTRAR: 667.

24 **EXHIBIT 667: Presentation - Application of**
25 **Networks to detect and mitigate organized**

1 **crime - March 2021**

2 MS. ROSE: All right. Madam Registrar, could we
3 please move to the second page of this
4 presentation.

5 Q So perhaps I'll turn the floor to you, Mr. Dent.
6 Could you explain what this presentation
7 details.

8 A (PD) So the objective of the presentation is to
9 provide an example for discussion purposes of
10 how data aggregation or data sharing,
11 information sharing, would allow for a better
12 insight into the detection of financial crime
13 networks, and with a specific focus on real
14 estate transactions and with a further
15 additional focus of BC-related data initially.
16 That was the primary objective behind the
17 presentation, and with respect to this slide,
18 what we're trying to impart is that the
19 transnational organized criminal economy is
20 currently connected, they are networked, and
21 they are very collaborative. And so the threats
22 that they pose are both -- are, you know,
23 integrated and they are multidimensional and
24 they are dynamic. And so from our perspective,
25 our approach is -- and the examples that we'll

1 be talking about today are the same or similar
2 in that we are looking at being collaborative,
3 the information being networked and being
4 connected. A critical difference, mind you, is
5 that is that our approach must respect the
6 expectations of privacy and security of that
7 data that Canadian legislation demands.

8 Q And, Mr. Dent, am I right that you're referring
9 to some notes?

10 A (PD) I am referring to the notes, yes. I'm
11 referring to some notes, yes.

12 Q And could you just tell us what those notes are,
13 please.

14 A (PD) They're just handwritten notes just that
15 assist me in making sure I get my point across
16 with respect to this slide.

17 MS. ROSE: And, Mr. Commissioner, I'm not sure if any
18 of the participants have any issue with Mr. Dent
19 referring to notes for that purpose. I
20 certainly don't.

21 THE COMMISSIONER: No, I'm hearing none and it seems
22 to me entirely appropriate, so I think we can
23 accept that Mr. Dent and any of the other panel
24 witnesses may refer to notes they have made as
25 an aide-mémoire.

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Peter Dent (for the commission)
Beth Dewitt (for the commission)
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1 MS. ROSE: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

2 THE COMMISSIONER: And of course should it come to
3 it, the notes can be exhibited themselves, but
4 again, I -- in the absence of any application to
5 that effect, I don't see the need for it. Thank
6 you.

7 MS. ROSE: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

8 Q So, Mr. Dent, you described the effort to create
9 this presentation today as a collaborative one
10 or a collective one, I should say. Could you
11 just briefly describe the expertise that
12 Deloitte has brought to bear and the expertise
13 that Quantexa has brought to bear in creating
14 this presentation?

15 A (PD) Certainly. So from my perspective I
16 specialize in financial crime investigations,
17 and so therefore my experience is primarily
18 focused on better ways of detecting evidence or
19 detecting risks around financial crime in
20 organizations or the impact of financial crime
21 on organizations and individuals. With me today
22 are some colleagues from both Deloitte and
23 Quantexa, and Mr. Stewart has been focused on
24 financial crime analytics for some time in
25 assisting clients around the detection of

1 financial crime risk by conducting advanced
2 analytics on data sets. And Ms. Dewitt is with
3 me today from the cyber and privacy group of
4 Deloitte to assist in providing an overview with
5 respect to this presentation and how it's
6 designed -- as an example, its design would
7 assist or aid in the detection of financial
8 crime networks but with a view of maintaining
9 both the data security and data privacy
10 expectations of both BC and the Canadian privacy
11 legislation.

12 And then Mr. Bell is here with us from
13 Quantexa with a specific focus on having worked
14 on this type of design with the software
15 Quantexa and how that software is used to aid in
16 the detection of networks and the visual
17 representation of network analysis.

18 Q Thank you. So I'll propose we now move to the
19 next slide. And I take it this is a bit of a
20 placeholder, so perhaps the next one. And you
21 know, as I ask questions today, I will do my
22 best to direct them to the appropriate witness,
23 but if I have made a mistake there, please don't
24 hesitate to correct me.

25 So, Mr. Dent, continuing on with you,

1 perhaps you could walk us through this slide,
2 please.

3 A (PD) So this slide is an illustrative example of
4 how a system of information sharing could be
5 designed in order to enable the detection of or
6 conduct network analysis, and I think the best
7 way of sort of walking through this sort of
8 slide would be through an example -- a
9 fictitious example, but nonetheless an example
10 to help understand exactly what we're trying to
11 impart with respect to how this system or this
12 platform would aid the detection of a network in
13 real estate data.

14 And so, for example, one of the money
15 laundering typologies or financial crime
16 typologies that we would look for in real estate
17 is -- within the province of BC would be to take
18 information that is being provided to LTSA, for
19 example, under the Land Ownership Transparency
20 Registry about the beneficial ownership of
21 property here in the province and -- as a
22 starting point, and therefore enable us to
23 identify or whomever to identify, this platform
24 to identify exactly those properties that are
25 owned, for example, by numbered companies in the

1 province. So any property, any condo, any
2 commercial -- sorry, any residential real estate
3 property that is owned by a private company or a
4 numbered company could be identified. And then
5 through the land ownership transparency registry
6 the identity of the beneficial owner of that
7 property would be identified. That information
8 could then be matched against a publicly
9 available through a subscription -- through a
10 subscription to a watch list, and that watch
11 list would impart information related to who is
12 on that list that may be a politically exposed
13 person in a foreign jurisdiction but is also the
14 beneficial owner of a piece of land or an
15 individual that has been convicted in a
16 jurisdiction of a financial crime, and that
17 conviction is in the public record and therefore
18 is also identified as a land owner in the
19 province of BC. And this is of course not
20 indicative, I'm not suggesting that individual
21 or this ownership is in any way illegitimate.
22 It is just a starting point for analysis going
23 forward, human analysis going forward with
24 respect to that transaction.

25 And then moving back from that specific --

1 identifying that entity, that individual that
2 owns this property, it would allow you to go
3 beyond that by bringing in or networking to
4 other sources of data, whether that be BC
5 assessment data, BC registry data or other data
6 maintained in the province to corroborate the
7 information with respect to the ownership of the
8 private company, and then also it would enable
9 you to identify any other companies that that
10 individual or entity is also connected to. And
11 then going on from there to extrapolate or build
12 out your network on whether or not any of those
13 individuals or those other connected entities
14 also own land in the province of BC. So it's a
15 rudimentary example of showing how one
16 transaction or, you know, looking for one risk
17 factor allows you to dig down into one
18 transaction and allows to expand out into a more
19 fulsome view of a network and therefore
20 determine whether or not you would move forward
21 and continue analysis or whether or not the risk
22 factors have alleviated themselves through that
23 initial sort of view of this transaction. But
24 that is basically the -- how network analysis,
25 that information sharing allows for that network

1 analysis and the bringing together of disparate
2 sets of data to allow that to take place. So
3 I'll leave it there and perhaps you can pose a
4 similar question to one of my panelists to see
5 if they have any other comments.

6 Q Yes, and I was wondering if you could explain
7 why in your view such a program or such linkages
8 here are necessary or important. What is it
9 about the structure of this data right now that
10 isn't adequate?

11 A (PD) So the data -- for example, the data we are
12 sort of talking about or demonstrating on the
13 slide today is being collected through the
14 government right now, whether that be LTSA data,
15 BC assessment data, BC registry data. It is
16 being collected for a specific purpose, but
17 those specific purposes in many instances have a
18 connection to each other. So LTSA and BC
19 assessment data are related pieces of data, but
20 they sit in separate data sets. And so the --
21 there would be differences between the data
22 being collected, for example, by LTSA and BC
23 assessment. There would also be similarities
24 between those pieces of data as well. And so
25 allowing you to aggregate data such as that

1 together would provide additional insights, view
2 of individuals and entities with respect to
3 transactions around real estate in the province.
4 And then, again, the next step linking that to
5 BC registry data would again allow a link or a
6 connection to that data around company
7 ownership, for example, and allow you to be
8 informed with respect to additional information
9 that would not be available in the LTSA or BC
10 assessment data set. I hope that was clear.

11 Q It was. In terms of the way that the data is
12 available to an average member of the public
13 right now, that member of the public would be
14 able to access LTSA in its current database form
15 and they might be able to access certain data
16 from BC assessment and certain data from
17 Statistics Canada and from BC Registries. What
18 is the advantage of conducting this intelligence
19 hub as you describe?

20 A (PD) The advantage would be a single view of the
21 individual or the entity instead of separate
22 disparate views. So, I mean, I can go on to BC
23 Assessment website as a citizen and collect data
24 with respect to my own land ownership or, to the
25 extent that I understand what the identifiers

1 for a parcel of land are, I can find out
2 information about that piece of land as well.

3 What I cannot do is identify -- if I was
4 searching myself, for example, I can't identify
5 all property that I would own in the province
6 just going through this process at BC
7 Assessment. I would need to know unique
8 identifiers with respect to a single piece or
9 parcel of land to identify that. I would also
10 not be able to determine a corporate ownership
11 of every parcel of land that that corporation
12 owns in the province. I would need to keep
13 going in and out of a specific database in order
14 to determine that connectivity or that link
15 between an individual and an entity and with
16 other individuals and entities and then various
17 parcels of land in the province.

18 Q And I put this question out to any member of the
19 panel, but in the panel's experience, in what
20 way does the current format of the data in
21 different databases inhibit the detection or
22 investigation of illicit activity? Don't all
23 jump at once.

24 A (DS) Thank you, Kelsey. I think part of the
25 opportunity from looking, as Peter alluded to, a

1 holistic perspective is too often today to
2 identify potentially improper activity or
3 financial crime activity it's very reactive, so
4 I have to go in and I have to procure
5 information from each of the data sets. So part
6 of the construct that's being presented is that
7 if these data sets were some of what linked
8 under the appropriate, you know, provisions of
9 how you collect information and share it, one
10 could be more proactive in identifying risks as
11 it associates to the mandate or the various
12 personas that are identified in this chart,
13 which is, you know, that of the regulator, that
14 of a department, that of maybe some of the
15 intent of law enforcement. So, you know, if the
16 data is constructed as Peter alludes to with
17 this entity resolution, you can satisfy some of
18 the objectives of each of those deferred
19 mandates in a more succinct and efficient manner
20 than may be constructed today.

21 (AB) If I could add in a couple of things,
22 so if I talk from a technology perspective there
23 tends to be kind of two approaches to sharing
24 information. One is where all providers
25 essentially harmonize their data into a single

1 format and the other one is whereby multiple
2 formats can essentially be merged together. And
3 this is, I suppose, a fundamental difference
4 between an entity resolution approach and
5 potentially a simple name matching approach,
6 which we'll go into a bit later. But more
7 modern approaches like entity resolution can
8 actually take data in different formats and
9 identify the key underlying data elements within
10 that data to understand that in system 1, for
11 example, the name is in the third field. In
12 system 2, for example, it might be in the fifth
13 field. That allows you to more efficiently
14 share data more rapidly but also maintain the
15 privacy around certain key bits of information
16 because you are not reformatting your data
17 before you share it. You're sharing it as you
18 know it. And therefore you can design and make
19 available only the fields that you wish to in a
20 more modern process.

21 Q Thank you. And unless any of the panel members
22 have further comments I'll move to the next
23 slide.

24 A (DS) I just have one comment to observe, sorry.

25 Q Please do.

1 A (DS) Part of the construct that we're talking
2 about today, if we look at the top left on the
3 data centre element, is about the sheer scale of
4 doing some of the analysis that we're going to
5 demonstrate or my colleague Alexon will
6 demonstrate, but part of the construct of this
7 view is that these data sets will obviously grow
8 in size and magnitude, and so therefore it's
9 harnessing technologies or data centres of
10 services today, so this becomes a scaleable
11 solution for the future and not necessarily
12 trying to solve something for, you know, what's
13 currently in place.

14 So this is about a scaleable framework and
15 the ability to mitigate the privacy elements but
16 the challenges of this entity resolution and
17 network capabilities.

18 A (AB) Can I add one more thing to scaleability,
19 which is if you're looking just at the
20 province's data that is one scale. But actually
21 when you start to look at international
22 organized crime, right, and the wider network of
23 corporations, the data volumes do start to
24 increase very rapidly, so if you were to talk to
25 aggregated corporate information providers like

1 Bureau van Dijk or Dun & Bradstreet, they will
2 talk about having a registry which has, you
3 know, 280 million companies in it that are all
4 international, and if you're wanting to
5 understand international ownership of BC
6 properties, you would have to essentially find a
7 way to be able to work with those very large
8 international data sets to corroborate the
9 ownership of data or properties within the
10 province. So scale is not just something to be
11 looked at within one province or in effect one
12 nation, but actually there is an international
13 scale, right, to this data scale that does
14 increase it quite dramatically.

15 Q Okay. If we could turn to the next slide,
16 please. And I'm not sure -- I see Beth you're
17 nodding, so perhaps I'll ask you to explain this
18 slide for us, please.

19 A (BD) Thank you very much for the opportunity.
20 Good morning, everyone. What we wanted to
21 ensure as we look at a solution such as the one
22 that my colleagues have been describing is how
23 we can ensure that we build a framework in
24 support of the opportunity around this
25 intelligent hub that really puts the privacy,

1 security and well-being of individuals at the
2 centre of it, and that can be individuals or the
3 public overall, and in doing so we want to
4 create a framework that provides the guidance
5 and the rules of the road or the rules of
6 engagement around how data and information can
7 be used in a manner that allows for the
8 objectives of the hub and the types of financial
9 crime work that you'd like to do but also
10 protects the integrity of the data, the
11 integrity of the information about the
12 individuals and is ethical in how it's being
13 used.

14 So the way we would typically approach this
15 type of solution is to think about it as an
16 intersection between good governance, strong
17 ethical framing, privacy considerations drawn
18 from best practices and law, as well as the data
19 protection and security controls that you can
20 have established and built in. And that we want
21 to take a position of starting from a principles
22 approach, so a by-design approach to how we
23 establish the solution, the services that come
24 out of the solution and the processes in support
25 of the solution. And that starts by really

1 understanding what are the parameters in which
2 you want to operate, what are the risks you're
3 willing to take on, what are the ethical
4 guardrails you want to establish. Understanding
5 that viewpoint then allows you to understand
6 where you want to go in terms of how you're
7 going to use the data and draw insights. It
8 will also give you the opportunity to have the
9 flags that you need within the team that's using
10 the solution to make sure you're not going
11 outside of those established guardrails.

12 You of course want to draw in the legal and
13 best practices that are established from a
14 privacy by design and security by design
15 perspective. You need to understand what are
16 your enabling laws and what are the requirements
17 within those laws so that you can build a
18 foundation that is in law that allows you and
19 gives you permissions with the data that you
20 need to have. From there you want to continue
21 and make sure that you establish the right types
22 of security and permissions within that solution
23 and really use security as a way to enable the
24 right type of controls to limit the types of
25 things that you can do within the system, the

1 inferences that you can pull, who has access to
2 what and how it's going to be protected and the
3 information can get shared.

4 So this framework that you end up designing
5 it allows you to build, at least at the start, a
6 principled-based, grounded-in-law framework that
7 draws upon expertise of ethics, privacy
8 professionals, legal professionals and security
9 professionals, alongside the professionals who
10 have the expertise around financial crime and
11 the data in question. And then it allows you to
12 establish sort of the baseline set of rules that
13 you can then iterate along as you mature the
14 type of data that you have in the solution, the
15 use cases in front of you and you can continue
16 to build upon that framework as you establish
17 what type of intelligence you're able to derive
18 from the hub. I'll pause there and see if
19 there's any questions and look to my colleagues
20 if there's anything to add.

21 Q I did want to ask a question about your last
22 comment with respect to the learning process or
23 the iterative process. Is that anticipated to
24 be an artificial intelligence process or is that
25 a manual input process?

1 A (BD) The iterative process of understanding the
2 type of boundaries and guardrails that you want
3 to have in place, that would be something that
4 is done in a manual way or done through human
5 intervention and discussion. So that's where
6 you're drawing upon the experts at the table to
7 say based on what we're learning and we're
8 seeing are there new types of guardrails we need
9 to establish or are there ways in which we can
10 change how it is we're going to use data to meet
11 new opportunities and, again, put it through the
12 iterative process of understanding are the
13 controls in place appropriate or do they need to
14 change. So it's a feedback loop that takes
15 place and requires that very much the human
16 element to be part of that.

17 Q I'll just turn it to any other panel members
18 before we turn to the next slide. Hearing
19 nothing, Madam Registrar, if we could turn to
20 the next slide, please, and the slide after
21 that, please.

22 A (AB) Hi. Yes. This is one of my slides. I
23 think the next series are actually my slides.
24 So I wanted to really talk you through some
25 differences in trying to ascertain and piece

1 together intelligence when investigating kind of
2 financial crime. And so I wanted to really
3 start by distinguishing between a traditional
4 searching or matching approach on the left-hand
5 side and entity resolution, which is a more
6 modern approach to this problem.

7 If you think about whenever you've searched
8 from something on the internet with your
9 favourite search engine you will type something
10 into that engine and you'll hit enter and it
11 will go against the entire internet but it will
12 return results and sometimes those results are
13 not very accurate, and you know, if you're
14 looking at company information you want to
15 understand who owns a company that you might be
16 buying goods from online, you might find that if
17 you search, you know, just generally you'll find
18 everyone, but you might then qualify that search
19 with a country. If you're looking for
20 directions to your friend's house that you've
21 not been to before, you type in a street's name.
22 And if it's a common street name, the high
23 street or something, you get many results. So
24 you basically refine that search parameters by
25 including things like countries or states,

Alexon Bell (for the commission)
Peter Dent (for the commission)
Beth Dewitt (for the commission)
David Stewart (for the commission)
Exam by Ms. Rose

1 right, or postal or ZIP codes. And when you're
2 looking to piece together intelligence, you're
3 doing this at scale and automatically with a
4 computer system.

5 So on the left-hand side, you know, you
6 might be looking for Alexon Bell and wondering
7 whether or not he has any links to your data.
8 So in the middle part in the method piece you've
9 got record 1, which is me, and you're going to
10 search against the other records either in the
11 same system or across multiple systems, and as
12 you can see here that is a singular search for a
13 singular search term against each record. And,
14 you know, it's a name match or a name and date
15 of birth match or a name and address match or
16 variants of that. But what does that mean for
17 the human person, right, that's doing the
18 search? I think that's the example and the
19 evidence at the last point of that side in the
20 example. If you have one system on the left
21 that has name and date of birth, and you have
22 system on the right that has name and address,
23 you have a problem because essentially what you
24 have is a name-only search in order to bring the
25 same Jamie Huttons together. So that means you

1 either run the risk of missing something, so if
2 you type in your Jamie Hutton with a date of
3 birth into system 2, you won't find it because
4 the data is not there to match it. And on the
5 converse, if you put Jamie Hutton with the
6 address from system 2 into system 1, again, it
7 won't match. So you're basically having to fall
8 back onto a name-only match, and that causes you
9 to have many false positives, that introduces
10 error into the process and also increases the
11 duration for that stage of just trying to
12 understand if the same record or the same
13 individual or the same business is the same one
14 in different databases. I'll pause there for
15 some questions.

16 Q Yes. I'm curious how would Quantexa be able to
17 determine that it is the same Jamie Hutton in
18 the example at the bottom?

19 A (AB) Yeah, so the Quantexa example is actually
20 on the right-hand side, so if I answer the
21 question by talking about the right-hand side
22 maybe that will give us a visibility.

23 So a more modern approach to doing that
24 search and retrieval is actually to think of all
25 of the possible search terms that you could have

1 around an individual. For example, my full
2 name, including middle name, my year of birth or
3 my date of birth, or maybe it's just my initial
4 and my surname, but you have a mobile phone
5 number or you have an email address. So you can
6 basically start to use all of these different
7 data combinations and what entity resolution
8 essentially does is it organizes them and
9 systematically queries all records in all
10 systems with all of those queries. And it's a
11 two-step process. So the first step process it
12 casts the net wide. But then it looks at the
13 data that it comes back, that that search brings
14 back, and it starts to basically piece together
15 different pieces of information. So what you
16 might have in system 2 is you have Jamie Hutton
17 with a date of birth and in system 2 you've got
18 Jamie Hutton with a date of birth and his phone
19 number. That's very interesting because you can
20 then use that phone number to connect to
21 system 3; right? And that's basically Jamie
22 Hutton with his phone number and potentially his
23 address and, therefore, you can then take that
24 piece of information and connect to system 4
25 which has name and address only. An entity

1 resolution is that more advanced process of
2 being able to systematically search for
3 different combinations, and then when it brings
4 it back looks for the relevance in the way that
5 it combines information to basically tell you
6 that actually this is the same Jamie Hutton
7 across different systems and platforms.

8 Q Well, that's quite clear. Unless any of the
9 panel members have further comments I would
10 suggest we move to the next slide.

11 A (DS) Just one comment to overlay what Alexon was
12 alluding to. The permutations that are being
13 described in the bottom right of the slide, this
14 is predicated on what Beth was alluding to where
15 data sets that have been pushed through or
16 processed through some privacy framework and so
17 therefore what Alexon is alluding to is the
18 attributes in data sets that already have been
19 collected and how you would search across those
20 data sets. So when we allude to the combination
21 of phone, email, et cetera, et cetera, that's
22 predicated on information that's already been
23 submitted and the data sets are sources that
24 would be identified in the framework of the
25 intelligence hub.

1 Q Thank you.

2 A (DS) Thank you.

3 Q Next slide, Madam Registrar.

4 A (AB) So in Quantexa, we work with the concept of
5 entities and networks, so I really wanted to
6 start to give you a brief introduction into
7 certain things that you're going to see over the
8 next slides and also in the demonstration.

9 So the way that we assemble networks is
10 essentially we start with a set of documents.
11 You can think of them actually as physical
12 things like an application form or the KYC
13 details to open a bank account, but they could
14 also just be rows in a database like in the land
15 registry, who owns this property. They could
16 also be things like a corporate record, right,
17 in a company's house financial transactions or
18 at the bottom kind of watch lists.

19 So these are essentially an aggregate set
20 of information from which you can pull
21 interesting things which we call entities that
22 essentially relate to real world people, places,
23 things that you might want to ask questions of
24 or in this case make connections to. So you can
25 see here a natural person, an address, a

1 telephone number, landline specifically,
2 different icons for mobiles, businesses, emails,
3 bank accounts, et cetera. So this is the kind
4 of iconography that you'll see over the next few
5 slides and into the demonstration, but
6 essentially we are working with a set of
7 documents on the left-hand side which will then
8 have links or lines to the real world entities
9 which you can see a subset on the right-hand
10 side.

11 Q So you've given us a bit of a legend for the
12 presentation and some of the diagrams to come?

13 A (AB) Correct, yes.

14 MS. ROSE: Okay. Madam Registrar, can we move to the
15 next slide, please.

16 THE WITNESS: (AB) So --

17 MS. ROSE:

18 Q Oh, sorry. I anticipate that this is another
19 one for you, Mr. Bell, if you could walk us
20 through this slide, please.

21 A (AB) Yes, of course. So this is really a kind
22 of mini journey from document to visualization
23 from left to right, so this slide is about how
24 we can identify key bits of information within a
25 document, which is much more static in nature,

1 right, it's an application form, a KYC form.
2 The next slide is about how we can use the
3 very -- you know, the same process in effect to
4 work with financial transactions.

5 So all of us will have filled in an
6 application form at some point in our life;
7 right? In days gone by that would have been a
8 paper form. Now most of these have been
9 digitized or actually the application form is
10 online. So that means that, as you can see in
11 the middle piece, we have a land registry form
12 with some key data items. That's not all of it,
13 but just a representation of some of the things
14 that might be captured in that form. And,
15 again, you can think of different forms with
16 different sorts of businesses and the different
17 types of data you might capture. So you can
18 kind of use this as a generic placeholder for
19 other data items in other applications. But
20 essentially you can see that at the top here in
21 the land registry we have a business called Acme
22 Limited. It's all fictitious this. It has a
23 document reference number, a start date of when
24 they purchased the property, whether they're
25 still there, and then some information around

1 who the person is, contact information,
2 addresses, signatories, et cetera. And all
3 Quantexa does is it turns that into the first
4 building block of a network. And this is very
5 simple. So in the middle, right, you can see
6 that document icon called Acme Limited, right,
7 that's the land registry document, and inside
8 that document we have telephone numbers, emails,
9 basically essentially all of that information
10 transposed from that physical document. Does
11 that make sense?

12 Q It does. Were there any other comments from the
13 panel in this slide? Okay.

14 Madam Registrar, if we can move to the next
15 slide then, please.

16 And if you could walk us through this again,
17 Mr. Bell.

18 A (AB) Yeah, of course. So what's interesting is
19 when you start to blend the kind of more static
20 reference information with financial data, so
21 financial transactions which are money
22 movements, so when investigating financial
23 crime, we always focus on trying to follow the
24 money, right, and you follow the money typically
25 through transactions and ownership of

1 businesses. So it's important to be able to
2 replicate that process. And at this stage we
3 are taking the land registry form, which is
4 essentially owned by a business, and you might
5 want to corroborate that that business is
6 actually incorporated in Canada. So as you can
7 see on the left-hand side this is the data from
8 the land registry and this is a generic thing on
9 the right-hand side from the corporate registry.
10 And at the top you can see the various things
11 that we could match against to give us
12 confidence that actually the record in the land
13 registry is the company that's on the corporate
14 registry. So, for example, the name matches,
15 the address of the company matches and the
16 authorized signatory on your records is actually
17 a director or a shareholder of the business,
18 right, that has the corporate registry.

19 So now you can see how we are starting to
20 build some connections from internal data to
21 external data. Make sense?

22 Q It does. And with this sort of matching
23 process, is there sort of a baseline number of
24 fields that must match for you to have assurance
25 that you're dealing with the same company, or

1 how do you assess that?

2 A (AB) So matching is assessed -- again, number of
3 fields is a great way to do that, but there is
4 also the kind of rarity of bits of information
5 within the world. So certain things are very
6 unique to individuals, passport numbers,
7 national IDs, for example, company IDs. They
8 are unique. So therefore if we find those
9 things that match, we can have a great degree of
10 confidence that they are the same record. We
11 would also then want to run, right, if we were
12 to search for the company ID for Acme Limited
13 and it matched, but it matched against, you know
14 the Walnut Company, right, then we may ask
15 questions of why that is. So there are some
16 kind of safeguards in there to kind of identify
17 when matching is not correct so we can gain some
18 surety.

19 There are also things that allow us, I
20 suppose, to triangulate information very well.
21 So bizarrely things like name, full name and
22 full date of birth are not very good things to
23 search on. And especially if you have a common
24 name, like a John Smith, you'll find many more
25 of them. So in that example, just matching on

1 those two things, whereas my name Alexon Bell is
2 very rare. So you could have a great degree of
3 confidence that that match is correct. We would
4 use the other factors to corroborate that, so
5 what is my address, what is my postcode and
6 therefore you can narrow down -- and again,
7 postcode is a good thing to look at because in
8 the UK postcode probably represents 50 houses
9 where ZIP code in the US could be thousands.
10 So, again, we need to have a measure of how many
11 potential matches there are in the population
12 before gaining surety that actually this is the
13 right one.

14 But I think also within this process this
15 is technology assisting a human investigation,
16 so where the technology is running in the
17 background identifying these matches, it then
18 presents that essentially to a human
19 investigator to conduct the full research and
20 verification.

21 Q And are there some baseline requirements for the
22 data in order to be able to do this type of
23 resolving process or the matching process. You
24 know, for example, must the data be in a machine
25 readable format?

1 A Yes, it must. So all of this is making the
2 assumption that the data is in a database, in
3 tables that software can read. There are things
4 that can support the digitization of paper
5 documents, so technologies like optical
6 character recognition, another branch of
7 technology called entity extraction, so
8 identifying from text and words which ones
9 relate to addresses and people and which ones
10 are just verbs and adverbs, et cetera. So there
11 are other technologies that can help if data is
12 in -- still in paper format. But mostly we see
13 that this information has been digitized to a
14 greater or less degree that allows software that
15 uses entity resolution to work.

16 Q Thank you. I'd suggest we move to the next
17 slide, Madam Registrar, please.

18 A (PD) I was just going to raise one point,
19 Ms. Rose.

20 Q Certainly. Please do, Mr. Dent.

21 A (PD) With respect to the matching exercise
22 between various data sets, one of the other
23 benefits of this is to enable a verification
24 exercise. So, for example, data that is being
25 maintained in the land ownership transparency

1 registry could be -- could be examined from a
2 verification perspective by matching it against
3 other data sets that contain the similar
4 attributes. So a unique identifier could be
5 just a phone number. Each of us has a unique
6 phone number assigned to us or a corporation,
7 and therefore being able to match against a
8 unique phone number and then having one database
9 have different information in it than the Land
10 Ownership Transparency Registry, for example,
11 could point in the direction of one set of data
12 is not accurate and lead to followup in terms of
13 making sure that the information in one or the
14 other is updated.

15 Q Understood. Thank you.

16 Next slide, Madam Registrar, please.

17 And I'm not sure who to turn this one to.
18 Perhaps I'll start with Mr. Bell.

19 A (AB) It is. We're still with me, thank you,
20 Ms. Rose.

21 So essentially what we're doing here is we
22 are starting to attach. From the very first
23 simple network built around Acme Limited and
24 your internal records, we're starting to find
25 those additional matches in the external

1 records. So you can see there at the bottom the
2 corporate registry information of Acme Limited
3 with some of its directors and Joe Bloggs and
4 the address, et cetera, linking to your internal
5 data. So this is starting to form a simple
6 network within the software but also allowing
7 you to identify how we have made the links
8 between those different systems of record. So
9 "123 Main Street Joe Bloggs" are the same
10 between your internal record at the top and the
11 corporate registry record at the bottom. So
12 it's really important kind of for audit purposes
13 and traceability that the software that does
14 this is transparent in the way that it links so
15 that a human being can verify that actually
16 these links are correct and then make the
17 correct outcome of the investigation.

18 Q And so in this example here there are three
19 indicators that are in both data sets, and that
20 is the address of the residence, the name of
21 Mr. Bloggs and the company name; is that right?

22 A (AB) Correct, yes. And there could very well be
23 other information that we're not drawn here like
24 telephone numbers or emails, but they would
25 essentially allow you to see the lines of

1 connections between those documents and the
2 entities that have linked them.

3 Q Thank you.

4 A (DS) Ms. Rose, a question -- or a response. By
5 creating a network by definition it does not
6 mean it's an adverse or a negative inference
7 here. So the concept here is connecting common
8 attributes, but just because there is a
9 connection it does not automatically transfer to
10 negative activity. So this is an evolution of
11 what do we do next, and that's part of the
12 intent here is not to by insinuating saying
13 there's a connection there must be something
14 here. So this is part of the intelligence
15 exercise.

16 Q Thank you for clarifying.

17 Madam Registrar, if we can have the next
18 slide, please.

19 And again, I'll turn the floor to you
20 Mr. Bell, to explain what this slide is
21 depicting.

22 A (AB). Yeah, so this slide is now starting to
23 work with financial transactions. So on the
24 left-hand side is a representation of a SWIFT
25 message, so this is typically a well-recognized

1 international payment standard which allows you
2 to transfer information around who is
3 originating the funds and who's the beneficiary
4 of them.

5 It contains information around banks and
6 companies and addresses and amounts and other
7 pieces of information, and what we're
8 essentially doing here, and this aids the
9 financial investigation and also detection, is
10 by allowing a computer system to start to build
11 more information on what essentially is just a
12 name and address from a financial transaction.
13 So we would call this a counterparty, so a
14 non-customer side of a transaction. So Umbrella
15 Company here is not a customer. Like, it's in
16 Russia. It's sending money to Acme Limited, who
17 is the customer of yours that we've kind of been
18 building that network for. So it's a
19 counterparty. And very little is known about
20 Umbrella Company here in Russia, other than it
21 sent some money. What entity resolution allows
22 you to do when you can link that to the
23 corporate registry information is to start to
24 pull in information that would allow you to have
25 a broader picture of who Acme Limited is, who

1 their ownership is, their financials, industry
2 codes, et cetera, and we apply a very similar
3 technique to link into the internal corporate
4 registry to the financial transaction. Here we
5 do a little bit more around the ordering of
6 data. So we call that parsing. And we would
7 essentially look to understand those different
8 data elements.

9 At the top is something called a bank
10 identification code, it contains the bank and
11 the country. So here you can see the "RU,"
12 correspondence to a country called Russia, and
13 that is one of the keys that we're using to
14 match into the corporate registry. Then we have
15 the name of the entity, Umbrella Company,
16 matching to the corporate registry and then we
17 have some address information that also
18 corresponds. So now we can take a reasonably
19 sparse amount of transactional information and
20 enrich that with all of the details of the
21 corporate information from the registry that
22 we've collected.

23 Q And when you use the term "customer" could you
24 just explain what you're referring to there?

25 A So customer would be any record that you own

1 yourself. So it would be -- I have a property,
2 I've given you my details, I would be a customer
3 of the land registry. I have a bank account, I
4 put my applications and details and I'm a
5 customer of the bank. You know, I use whatever
6 is home delivery service for fast food. I would
7 be a customer of theirs. So customer here is a
8 very generic term used to describe, I suppose,
9 data that you own on an individual that you have
10 a relationship with.

11 Q Thank you. Are there any other comments that we
12 should hear with respect to this slide? Okay.

13 Madam Registrar, if we can turn to the next
14 slide, please.

15 Mr. Bell, on to you again.

16 A (AB) Yes. So now we're starting to assemble a
17 fully fledged financial network from the data
18 that we received. And what you can see is on
19 the left-hand side was the network that we
20 started with, and we're going to start in the
21 blue bit, the financial wire message, where we
22 can see 20,000 being sent to Acme Limited from
23 Umbrella Corporation. That's on the right-hand
24 side. And then as we've matched Umbrella
25 Company to its corporate registry we can see us

1 pulling those details in, telephone numbers and
2 addresses, but also we are starting to bring in
3 shareholders and directors. So we can find
4 that, for example, Umbrella Corporation is a
5 subsidiary of Megacorp PLC and Sergei there is
6 also a significant shareholder of Umbrella
7 Corporation.

8 What's interesting is using those corporate
9 registry records, again, you can see that
10 Globocorp at the bottom is linked to Sergei
11 himself as well, which connects back to the
12 corporate registry regard for Acme Limited. So
13 here you can see that actually the organization
14 that is sending the funds owns the business that
15 is registered as the owner of the property.
16 Does that mean it's good or it's bad? That
17 really does depend on the other connections that
18 we can find in data. Because that could be a
19 very normal transaction. I set up a business to
20 buy properties; I have other companies that hold
21 those funds; I have transferred those funds to
22 my business in Canada to buy the property. So
23 that looks completely legitimate. However, we
24 have in red some watch list information. And
25 this is where we can start to maybe change the

1 view on here that maybe this is something a bit
2 riskier than previously thought. So that watch
3 list could be something that you have a
4 subscription to, so there are providers out
5 there like Dow Jones or World-Check or Accuity
6 that provide commercial watch lists. These
7 could be the own kind of Bank of Canada watch
8 lists for sanctions, et cetera, and it could
9 also be shared information maybe from law
10 enforcement both domestically and
11 internationally, and we can use those as watch
12 lists, which would essentially allow you to be
13 able to flag certain things of interest in an
14 overall network. And in this case here, Sergei
15 happens to be a politically exposed person in
16 Russia. So that could mean -- and again, the
17 investigation, the human investigation will
18 determine whether or not this might breach
19 something like the OFAC's 50 percent rule and
20 actually just validate that Sergei is that
21 politically exposed person or he's just
22 unfortunate enough to share enough matching
23 credentials to the watch list.

24 In the middle you can see a watch list
25 record and then, yeah, again this is again

1 pulling out certain key bits of information. So
2 there are many financial transactions that
3 happen all the time. You can use watch list to
4 pull out ones that are interesting, like things
5 that mention house purchases in this example for
6 real estate, to make that link a little bit more
7 relevant within the overall network.

8 Q Understood. Anything further from any of the
9 other panel members?

10 All right. Madam Registrar, if we could
11 have the next slide, please.

12 A (AB) Yes. So this is where we're going to segue
13 into a live demonstration of the Quantexa
14 software. So I just wanted to give some
15 perspective. The demonstration that you'll see
16 is built with fictitious synthetic data without
17 the use of any personally identifiable
18 information. The names and locations you will
19 see are potentially valid names and real
20 locations. This is designed to provide a sense
21 of realism to the audience, but they are not
22 referencing real people that have links to that
23 location. So really the data is just synthetic,
24 but they are names that you'll recognize.

25 Any links that may occur are inadvertent or

1 coincidental. We make -- Quantexa makes no
2 assumptions or aspersions on any individual or
3 organization. The overview of entity networks
4 and the demonstration does not provide any legal
5 right to any intellectual property in any
6 Quantexa proprietary information or products.

7 Q And so while the demonstration will be entirely
8 fictitious, the types of connections that you
9 display are similar to what you've seen in
10 conducting real world investigations?

11 A (AB) Correct, yes. So the system that you'll
12 see is a Quantexa demonstration environment. We
13 use that for all of our demonstrations for all
14 of our kind of solutions. So those would be
15 investigations within, you know, banks or
16 insurance companies and the different product
17 areas that we have. So not just within
18 financial crime, but within fraud and within
19 kind of customer intelligence. So there's quite
20 a lot of information in here. It's all
21 completely synthetic, but essentially it's a
22 single environment that allows us to demonstrate
23 a coherent vision of Quantexa across different
24 use cases.

25 What we have done for the commission is we

1 transactions and the land registry could be
2 analyzing those transactions on a regular basis
3 and highlight a few of them that would warrant a
4 human investigation to understand whether these
5 are isolated incidents or actually whether or
6 not there could be linkages between them that
7 might indicate that this is something that's
8 linked to organized crime.

9 So in this case I've kind of got three
10 names that we would like to talk to you about.
11 These names have been identified because of
12 their unusual property transactions and this is
13 really just a demonstration of the software's
14 capabilities to link information, build networks
15 and present that to users for a decision. And
16 we can talk about some of the kind of privacy
17 elements in here as well around how we can or
18 won't use data.

19 So within the platform we have some
20 information, and as you can see we have
21 financial transactions in here. I'm going to
22 exclude those. I have some corporate registry
23 information in here. So this is something
24 that's aggregating from someone like Dun &
25 Bradstreet or Bureau van Dijk. I have trades.

1 So, again, these could be financial markets or
2 trade finance transactions. I have CRM details,
3 so you can think about cross sale and up sale
4 things. I'll exclude those. I have ICIJ. So
5 this is a very common data set. The
6 International Journalists have released this
7 list of information to do with leaks from
8 Mossack Fonseca, et cetera, and again, this is
9 all sanitized. But you will see some icons that
10 connect to ICIJ. That's just representative of
11 one form of watch list or data that that can be
12 ingested.

13 We have Dow Jones, right, so this is a
14 subscription-based watch list akin to
15 World-check, and, again, the data you will see
16 some icons that link to Dow Jones, which we have
17 permission to show them, but again the data
18 behind it and all synthetic. There can be
19 investigation notes in here where people can
20 start to make notes about what they are seeing,
21 in the investigations, you can also search
22 those. And then lastly you have customers. So
23 I'm going to imagine that I am an investigator
24 at the land registry, and I am basically going
25 to investigate these three individuals that have

1 had the strange property transactions.

2 So the search is going to start by looking
3 for, again, different things. You can search
4 for individuals, businesses, incorporation
5 dates. There are other search criteria around
6 focusing in on address information. But I'm
7 going to start by searching for an individual
8 called Lindsay David. And I've found her as a
9 customer. I can click on her. We can see her
10 records and I'm going to take this search result
11 and I'm going to start to build some networks.
12 So I can click on this and I'm going to follow
13 the network and I'm going to describe this after
14 I've done the second search. So the second
15 search is about a gentleman called Tobias Black.
16 And we also find him. And I'm going to add that
17 to the investigation I was currently looking at.
18 So now I have two individuals. I have Tobias
19 Black here, right, and this is his icon as an
20 individual. He has some exclamation mark, which
21 we'll come to in a minute. The 11 says there
22 are 11 connections in the data that I can see.
23 So behind here is a security framework that
24 basically dictates what data sets I can see
25 within the platform. So as I'll show you going

1 through here, you'll see certain abilities to
2 bring in new information. Now, if I don't have
3 permission to see a data set, I won't be allowed
4 to bring in that information, so I cannot make
5 the connections in the data.

6 Q Does that -- sorry, Mr. Bell, to interrupt you.
7 When you say you won't see it, is it that you
8 won't see the number 11, you might see a
9 number 8, for example, or is that you would see
10 11, you just won't be able to click on it?

11 A (AB) No, you would see 8. So your record count
12 of connections would be reduced. So we have
13 designed this working with very large banks that
14 has to manage the privacy requirements of
15 different countries. So one requirement would
16 be, you know, I might be an investigator in a
17 country. If that is the case, I could only see
18 that country's data. If I'm a regional
19 investigator I might be able to see
20 10 countries' data, et cetera, and very few
21 global investigators would be able to see
22 everything. But that permissioning of data is
23 super important for data-sharing utilities like
24 the intelligence hub. Essentially different
25 personas or different consuming units like land

1 registry, police, other law enforcement agencies
2 will get different views of the data and make
3 different connections with software through this
4 entity resolution process.

5 We have also here Lindsay David, and we
6 have some bank accounts here. Now, I'm going to
7 delete those because they're going to come in
8 the second part of the demonstration. So I'll
9 delete those from the view and we're essentially
10 now left with these two individuals, and we want
11 to try and understand whether there's anything
12 interesting in the connections between these
13 individuals. And this is where scoring comes
14 into play. So scoring here, again, it will have
15 gone through a governance process between the
16 organizations as to what valid scores can be
17 created and deployed. It's a demonstration, so
18 the value of these scores will be determined
19 more accurately in a project, but this should
20 give you an example of the sorts of things that
21 we might find and then really the score is an
22 indication of how interesting those connections
23 or anomalies might be.

24 So if we go from the top, we can expand
25 here. So the scores are displayed in

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1 understandable English. We can see that as I
2 click on it Lindsay David is highlighting is
3 linked to "an extremely high Dow Jones,
4 category: financial crime," as is Tobias. And
5 If I click on those you can see both of them are
6 linked to high-risk categories. Lindsay has
7 some AML alerts on her account. That's the
8 legacy of the banking demonstration. But we can
9 come back to that. Both of these individuals
10 have links to ICIJ, but you notice here that no
11 ICIJ document is on the network. So we'll come
12 back to that. And there has been some ID
13 manipulation. Tobias Black has multiple dates
14 of birth across some of these 11 records that we
15 have found for him. So we will definitely want
16 to want to have a look at that. So I'll
17 collapse this and we'll start to kind of
18 investigate. So the first thing is -- we'll
19 come back to the risk, but we might want to
20 understand these ICIJ connections within the
21 data.

22 So what I will do is in the software, as we
23 ask to bring in data it's like a human being
24 doing a search like I did to find Tobias and
25 Lindsay and bring this in. But essentially this

1 expansion template is a predefined automated
2 search against the data sets that I am allowed
3 to see.

4 So the first things that we see at the top
5 are all to do with financial transaction
6 expansion. So we'll leave that to the other
7 part of the demonstration. But below that there
8 are some other expansions. So essentially think
9 of this is as a search and retrieval of
10 information that's relevant, right, to Tobias
11 and Lindsay. So here we have one degree
12 corporate. So can I link Tobias to the
13 corporate registry information. One degree
14 customer, can I link that to my own data within
15 the organization. One degree offshore is a link
16 to ICIJ. So, again, here's where the security
17 corms in. If I'm not allowed to see a certain
18 data item that expansion template does not exist
19 for me. I can't do the search against that
20 database, so I won't bring in the record. So
21 here we're investigating the link to ICIJ which
22 is offshore, so I can say okay, bring in any
23 connections to offshore for these individuals.
24 And lo and behold I can find now this ICIJ
25 document that connects Tobias and Lindsay. I

1 can click on -- sorry. Go ahead.

2 Q I'm sorry. Before we get into that one, I see
3 that Mr. Dent has unmuted himself, so I just
4 wanted to inquire, Mr. Dent, if you have
5 anything to add.

6 A (PD) If Mr. Bell went back to that original
7 slide that looked at the data sources. He's
8 mentioned in terms of data access or user access
9 to different data sets. I just wanted to
10 elaborate a little bit.

11 When you're using an application such as
12 this, there would be the ability to filter which
13 users have access to which data. So, for
14 example, law enforcement may have the greatest
15 amount of access to this data depending on what
16 the parameters are set up or how the system is
17 designed from an intelligence hub perspective.
18 But there can be a variety of other users that
19 want to have access to some or a subset of this
20 data. They could be regulators from the gaming
21 sector perspective. They could be regulators
22 from the real estate perspective. They could be
23 individuals from, for example, the civil
24 forfeiture's office. But there's all sorts of
25 different use cases that would enable different

1 stakeholders to have access to not necessarily
2 all of the data. It would depend on how that
3 data is set up. But also -- but also how that
4 data is actually shared or what data is actually
5 shared from the outset. There's also the
6 framework of privacy, but I don't know if
7 Ms. Dewitt has a comment on that.

8 A (BD) I mean, I think you summarized it well,
9 which is when this type of hub is established
10 and the different users identified whether
11 within the same entity or across entity, that's
12 where you would work through your framework to
13 establish what type of permissions each entity
14 will have and if there are any data sharing
15 permissions between entities, what that would
16 look like and what the required contractual or
17 agreement-based obligations would be built into
18 that. So there's lots of -- everything that's
19 coming through in this demo has already gone
20 through that framework that we spoke about at
21 the beginning. And now the assumption is we
22 have the right permissions in place, the right
23 controls established, the right rules and
24 principles governing what we're now seeing. And
25 then that's -- that kind of assumption can be

1 applied to the demo here as well.

2 Q And I think this might be a question for
3 Mr. Bell, but when we're incorporating data
4 sources like ICIJ and Dow Jones, some of which
5 are paid services but some of which are just
6 accessible to all, Quantexa is not applying any
7 sort of filter or assessment of the voracity of
8 the information contained in those databases
9 or -- it's simply taking the data that is there
10 and incorporating it into the software; is that
11 right?

12 A (AB) Correct, yes. So we have -- we are a data
13 agnostic platform, so we can take, accept data
14 from anywhere in any format and essentially what
15 we are good at is identifying the entities and
16 finding the connections between them. It is
17 down to those data providers that provide you to
18 give those assurances.

19 (PD) The only -- one of the advantages,
20 though, is that you have multiple points of
21 comparison. So, for example, if an individual
22 does not share accurate information, you know,
23 with the Land Ownership Transparency Registry
24 around beneficial ownership, this sort of a
25 design would enable a user to corroborate that

1 information across multiple domains, and
2 therefore it at least gives or provides
3 additional comfort or evidence as to whether the
4 information contained in one database is
5 accurate in comparison with multiple other
6 sources of data with respect to that individual
7 or entity.

8 Q Right. And so an investigator conducting this
9 type of analysis might receive some comfort
10 from -- or might have some credence
11 [indiscernible] databases because there are
12 these commonalities, but ultimately that
13 assessment would be up to the individual
14 investigator?

15 A (PD) Yes, that's correct. There's always an
16 element of human intervention here, human
17 analysis that is necessary to make determination
18 as to how, you know, the voracity of the
19 connections that are basically in front of the
20 user.

21 Q Understood. Thank you. Mr. Bell, I interrupted
22 you as you were describing the incorporation of
23 this ICIJ node into this network here?

24 A (AB) Yeah, thank you, Ms. Rose. This is
25 basically showing you -- and remember, we talked

1 about documents being the source of
2 information -- I can click on this source and
3 you can see all of the other bits of information
4 that are contained within it. And I can choose
5 to add pieces individually or simply just double
6 click and then it will bring all of the
7 additional pieces of information together. And
8 as you can see, it will start to interact with
9 other things like map views. Again, synthetic
10 data, so this is a fountain in Moscow. But,
11 again, if you are looking at properties, these
12 would be physical locations, and again, this is
13 masked, right, this particular road. So you can
14 validate where this property is, is it actually
15 real. And so you can start to see here that
16 these two potentially, right, erroneous
17 transactions from Lindsay and David purchasing
18 their properties, there might be a link between
19 them. And that link is coming through ICIJ,
20 which is an external piece of information.

21 If we look at scoring, you can see here
22 that we have again through Moscow some high-risk
23 country risk coming through, so we can also
24 start to look at other risk metrics, and again,
25 passing governance, et cetera, in order to deal

1 with what you want to see and what things might
2 be interesting.

3 Let's pick this top risk. So both of these
4 people have some Dow Jones risk together with
5 them. So, again, we can click on plus, and now
6 we can bring in this Dow Jones risk. Let's put
7 that over here. So not only now is Tobias and
8 Lindsay on an ICIJ record, this commercial watch
9 list also has some records for them. So if we
10 are to click on the record we can start to bring
11 in details. Again, it's all synthetic. But for
12 the story, Tobias here has been convicted on
13 October 2016 for eight money laundering offences
14 and sentenced to six years and seven months in
15 prison. So that would make him coming out in
16 2022. Maybe he's out early for good behaviour.
17 Lindsay, also mentioned as a partner in crime,
18 sentence to three years and six months
19 imprisonment -- what is she? -- for six money
20 laundering offences. So that makes this a lot
21 more interesting. So these two interesting
22 unusual property transactions are not only
23 linked by ICIJ, but they are connected to two
24 potential money launderers. So as you can see,
25 these two individuals -- the third name will

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1 come into the picture in a little bit -- raises
2 heightened suspicion that we might want to
3 investigate further.

4 Q And, sorry, Mr. Bell, to interrupt again. The
5 note that you were just referring to, and I'm
6 sorry if I'm asking you to repeat something that
7 you've already said, but can you just explain
8 where those notes come from and who would be
9 able to see those notes within this type of
10 platform.

11 A (AB) So those notes are provided by the list
12 provider, so in this case it would be Dow Jones.
13 And we pass those through a process. So
14 essentially we are just showing those notes as
15 Dow Jones has written them into the user
16 interface. And, again, permissioning for this
17 is if I have suitable permissions to find these
18 links, I will have access and see them. If I
19 don't, this information would not be available
20 to make the connections from within the
21 platform.

22 Q But in this system with the Dow Jones you would
23 not actually see a conviction record from the
24 source country?

25 A (AB) No. So I believe Dow Jones is looking at

1 news articles to indicate the conviction process
2 as opposed to court and criminal records.

3 Q Thank you. If you could just proceed to the
4 next one. Pick up where -- I've interrupted
5 you, I'm afraid.

6 A (AB) So let's look at scoring. So we want to
7 really try and understand this ID manipulation
8 of Tobias Black. So why has that score
9 triggered? And, again, I will just double click
10 here and I'll bring in all of the records that
11 link to Tobias.

12 So we can see in your record for Tobias
13 here -- this is your customer record -- he has a
14 date of birth of the 7th of May 1959. That's in
15 your records. But we have these three external
16 records from corporate registries and if we have
17 a look at this, this is L&S Murphy, Tobias Black
18 here as date of birth of the 8th of May. So
19 it's one day different. In The Five Rivers it's
20 the 8th of May, and in AT Building Services,
21 it's the 8th of May. So it's one day out;
22 right? It could quite possibly be what's called
23 fat finger where you've just mistyped that in
24 the entry record to put that into your system.
25 But it's interesting because using entity

1 resolution, and you remember how the process is,
2 it will go out to all of these databases with a
3 search criteria, it will come back and make the
4 comparison. It says actually there are some
5 differences here.

6 Why is ID manipulation important? Because
7 we know criminals deliberately change their
8 details to circumvent simple matching processes.
9 So the fact that we've been able to pick this up
10 is an indicator, but as you can see it's quite
11 lowly scored in the ranking, but it is a
12 precursor to something that could be a bit
13 riskier based upon other factors that are coming
14 in the network.

15 Q All right. And there are individuals who come
16 from jurisdictions perhaps where birth records
17 aren't as easy to obtain and so there are other
18 explanations for discrepancies in birthdates;
19 right?

20 A (AB) Yes, correct. For example, we know that in
21 the Muslim world older generation people will
22 say they were born on the 1st of January to
23 indicate the first half of the year or 1st of
24 June to indicate the second half of the year.
25 So all of those permutations can be taken into

1 account. But it's also bearing in mind that
2 entity resolution is all of those permutations.
3 So where we do see those 1st of January results
4 coming in with multiple matches, we can exclude
5 the full date of birth and rely on just the year
6 of birth in the search and the resolution
7 process.

8 Q And so that requires a bit of the application of
9 a human touch, if I can put it that way, in
10 order to not take as a straight line from the
11 data that something might be amiss here but
12 rather that it's a potential risk that might
13 require some further analysis?

14 A (AB) Could you just say that one again.

15 Q Sorry. I'm not finding the right words here.
16 But it would require some human intervention and
17 human judgment to be applied so that you're not
18 simply taking the fact that there are multiple
19 dates for a birthdate as a sign of illicit
20 activity is a potential risk factor, but it's
21 not one that you could simply draw a conclusion
22 from on its own?

23 A (AB) Yeah, so in this case we're using date of
24 birth to link to other records. So it is one
25 factor that allows us to, for example, link to

1 the Dow Jones watch list. So if there were
2 discrepancies in the date of birth, a human
3 being would have to judge the relative weight of
4 that connection and its relevance and choose to
5 include or exclude it in their investigation.

6 Q Thank you.

7 A (AB) No problem.

8 Q I'll ask you to continue on.

9 A (AB) So I talked about three individuals. So
10 let's search for the third individual called
11 Michael Green. Now, in this there is
12 technology, and as you can see I haven't found
13 Michael in that search result. And this is
14 quite common if you've used search engines. So
15 we can incorporate things like fuzzy matching in
16 that search request. It is built into entity
17 resolution as well, and you can see here that I
18 have now found the person I'm interested with
19 Michael Greene with an E on the end, no E in my
20 search term. And I can add Michael to that
21 investigation that I have been conducting.
22 Where is he? He's over here.

23 So in here, right, we start to build a
24 picture that these connections at the top
25 between Lindsay and Tobias could be quite risky

1 and we should probably delve deep into this.
2 Michael is actually unknown at the moment. Does
3 Michael connect to this kind of badder side of
4 the network or actually is Michael good and
5 doesn't have any connections at all.

6 So we brought in his document, which is
7 your record. If we expand that, the system will
8 automatically make connections in the data. And
9 in this case Michael is connecting via corporate
10 registry record to Tobias. So that becomes
11 quite interesting. And as you can see, we've
12 got some transaction cycles, so I'm going to
13 delete his account. As you can see as I deleted
14 that node from this view, the score disappeared.
15 And that's, again, some of the kind of privacy
16 things. If I can't see the data and I'm not
17 allowed to bring it into the network the score
18 is not triggering. So the scores are based
19 around what are users allowed to see and
20 essentially what we're displaying on this
21 network view.

22 So how has the scoring changed. So we've
23 got AML alerts now against Michael and Lindsay.
24 No more Dow Jones risk. Oh, but Michael is on
25 ICIJ, right, and that's a common theme that's

1 coming out from these three individuals.

2 They've all got offshore accounts linked to
3 them. Michael has got some ID manipulation and
4 that's the risk that we found already.

5 So why don't we have a look here at the
6 offshore risk of Michael. So, again, we can
7 basically click on this and start to bring in
8 those details. Let's just open one of these to
9 kind of get some more information. And as you
10 can see now, we've got some grey individuals.
11 So these individuals do not connect to your
12 data. They are genuinely external links from
13 ICIJ with no connections back to land registry
14 or whatever property documents that you have.
15 What's interesting is I brought in Michael's
16 address, and I brought a very interesting score
17 in, an inexpensive postcode score. And if we
18 expand this, we can start to try and understand
19 why we might use this. And it would be relevant
20 for land registry sale.

21 So in this case it says this fictitious
22 address in Vicarage Close is linked to four
23 offshore bank accounts and is in a low-value
24 postcode area and where the property is 78,000
25 pounds on average for this house. So, again,

1 could perform the same sorts of comparisons with
2 the system where we can pull in the land
3 registry. We can essentially geocode those to
4 postcodes and try and look for anomalies to
5 them. This is a slightly different anomaly that
6 we're detecting. It's essentially saying that I
7 have a very modest property that's linked to
8 offshore banking, which doesn't really make
9 sense. And if we go in, right, we can have a
10 look at Vicarage Close, and again synthetic
11 data. It links to some garages, but if we go
12 down the road, somewhere down this road, one of
13 these houses belongs to Michael. And that is
14 quite unusual, right, because you would expect
15 someone who has offshore bank accounts to live
16 in a slightly larger property than this. So we
17 can actually look at this and say that's quite
18 unusual. And also I've got a similar pattern
19 with the offshore pieces between all three
20 search results from that query that have unusual
21 property transactions.

22 The next thing I would probably look at,
23 right, so Michael is looking interesting, is I
24 would look at this business connection between
25 Tobias and Michael. If we look at this, we can

1 see full financial disclosures at the bottom
2 here, since they've been incorporated in 2016.
3 Quite a lot of money, right, 5 million here,
4 3 million, right, going through the bank. We
5 have a number of directors and some shareholders
6 of that information. We can see here that it's
7 active in trading. So actually it's probably
8 worth a good investigation of this. And I can
9 double click and basically bring in all of those
10 details associated with that company. And what
11 we have also brought in is a new individual,
12 George Lewis, and you notice George is in blue,
13 which means he matches some of your records, so
14 we might then want to go back and have a look at
15 the kind of risk matrix that we had before. So
16 if you remember we are a bit suspicious on ICIJ
17 connections, and actually we can see that George
18 has some. Oh, we actually have an inexpensive
19 postcode score triggering again. So if I look
20 into this, this address in Grimsby is linked to
21 two ICIJ documents and has a very low house
22 price. So again, I can click on the details and
23 have a look at it. Again, somewhere down this
24 road is this house. And, again, this is an
25 extremely cheap property and it would be very

1 unusual for it to have connections to offshore
2 banking. But if we have a look at this, not
3 only does it have connections to offshore
4 banking, there are nine other businesses
5 connected to this property up in Grimsby. So,
6 again, I can bring in this offshore record, and
7 as you can see they connect to George. And this
8 is very suspicious activity. So what we see
9 when we look at things where the same pattern
10 reoccurs, it piques our interest and someone
11 should really validate. So what we have is we
12 have lots of people on ICIJ and lots of
13 inexpensive postcodes, or a couple of them, that
14 are linking all of this data together. So we
15 would say -- and again, no guilt at the moment,
16 but there is a suspicion that there are some
17 significant connections between these unusual
18 property transactions that would warrant a
19 further investigation.

20 I wanted to pause there before switching
21 personas and talking about how we can
22 essentially link reference type information or
23 static data with financial data.

24 Q Yeah, I wanted to ask a couple questions. The
25 first is, you know, when you're referring to

1 sort of suspicion, really what the analysis is
2 there is that you're noticing a number of
3 features of these individuals, these companies,
4 these addresses, that are atypical?

5 A (AB) Correct. So what we have --

6 Q Sorry.

7 A (AB) Sorry.

8 Q Please expand on that.

9 A (AB) So What we have uncovered are connections
10 in data. What those connections mean actually
11 would be different for the types of
12 investigations, and some of these things may not
13 be something of significance. But in this
14 particular story, we are inferring that some of
15 these offshore connections look suspicious from
16 a property transaction because they're owned by
17 entities outside of the country.

18 Q Right. And then on the right-hand side here we
19 have the scoring, as you've described. Now, I
20 wanted to just understand a little more about
21 that scoring and how something becomes red or
22 orange or yellow or green and how you determine
23 the sort of weight of each of those factors that
24 are listed there.

25 A (AB) Yeah. This is very much a kind of

1 consulting exercise whereby we would want to
2 understand how an investigator works a case like
3 this and what things or what connections would
4 be interesting and their relative importance or
5 significance in that investigation. So, again,
6 this is a demonstration; right? It is all
7 completely fictitious, but these are some of the
8 things that we have found to be interesting in
9 financial crime investigations. Their
10 importance here is, again, something that we'd
11 have to work with the commission on. Is it 100
12 or 150, right, it makes no difference, but from
13 a demonstration purposes, as you can see, we've
14 got green, amber and kind of orange here to kind
15 of indicate the relative significance of one of
16 these triggering data matches within the
17 platform.

18 Q And so when you say that you would have to work
19 with the investigator, these scoring factors,
20 are they customizable?

21 A (AB) Completely. And as kind of Beth said,
22 there is a governance framework here, so if we
23 were to build this hub, what scores would we be
24 allowed to run in here that would be acceptable?
25 What data are we allowed to include for which

1 personas which would mean what scores would run
2 against them? So that's all part of the
3 governance process that would be built around
4 the hub.

5 Q And so I'm thinking in the context of real
6 estate, for example, the commission has heard
7 evidence that FINTRAC has come out with a set
8 of -- I think it's 26 indicators of suspicion in
9 real estate.

10 A (AB) M'mm-hmm.

11 Q Is that something that you could input to the
12 scoring system to see whether there's a match to
13 one of those indicators, for example?

14 A (AB) Absolutely. And we'd have to also identify
15 whether all of those 26 indicators had the
16 corresponding data needed to run them. So if
17 the data isn't available, we can't run them, but
18 yes, that would be the sort of exercise that we
19 would complete.

20 Q Okay. And I see Mr. Dent is unmuted again, so
21 I'll inquire if he has anything to add.

22 A (PD) Thanks, Ms. Rose. I would just add that
23 when we're looking from the context of the user
24 in front of these connections and making these
25 determinations, this is somebody that based on

1 the information that is being made available to
2 them, so if it is law enforcement, then it is
3 someone that has the years of experience and the
4 training in order to make a determination or
5 inferences with respect to the suspicions around
6 the connections or the, if you will, the read
7 flags being raised or being discussed as
8 examples by Mr. Bell. I'm not sure if there was
9 another panelist, Ms. Dewitt, that might have
10 something to add as well.

11 Q Yes, Ms. Dewitt, perhaps you can speak to this
12 from a privacy or compliance with the statutory
13 obligations standpoint.

14 A (BD) Can you repeat the base question for me.

15 Q I was just wondering if you had anything to add
16 with respect to the scoring system here and
17 whether there are particular considerations that
18 are -- that we ought to include when we're
19 considering how to formulate scoring.

20 A (BD) Well, I mean, like, within the legislation
21 itself, there could be rules that you might look
22 to pull in to help guide what scoring could look
23 like. I don't know there's specific attributes
24 per se that would help inform a score. It might
25 more just be around what parameters would be

1 around what scoring could look like. I'm trying
2 to think through what the legislation
3 specifically would call out on scoring.

4 Q I suppose if there are any other particular
5 privacy concerns with respect to developing a
6 scoring matrix, but otherwise I think you've
7 answered my question.

8 A (BD) Well, I mean, I think what it would be is
9 again, if you go back to the principles-based
10 approach and I think it's where you would also
11 probably layer in your ethical framework, and
12 often what we're seeing is actual ethicists
13 being brought into conversations to help design
14 frameworks, is thinking about, like, how many
15 numbers do you need, how many hits do you need
16 for something to be significant. How small a
17 number, how large a number, what type of
18 inferences might toe into a line of profiling or
19 not profiling. So I think there's some, again,
20 guiding principles there, but are there hard and
21 fast rules within the law? No. I think it
22 would be more based on the framework and
23 principals that you want to follow is at least
24 the starting place from that perspective.

25 Q Thank you. So, Mr. Bell, you were saying that

1 transactions.

2 So I'm not going to do the full transaction
3 analysis, but I will basically focus on things
4 that are interesting. So we are looking here at
5 Michael Greene's account. We might have a
6 subset of information available to us where we
7 have found an interesting counterparty that has
8 sent money to Michael, and it's called Offshore
9 Incorporated. So I will add this to the view.
10 And as you can see here, we have some nice
11 coloured lines that will give us an indication
12 of the flow of funds.

13 So essentially money is going from Offshore
14 Incorporated and there are three transactions of
15 \$12,000 -- if it was a real property purchase it
16 would be significantly higher -- to Michael's
17 account mentioning Michael at the bank. So here
18 you can see the difference between referential
19 linkages and financial flow linkages, which are
20 coloured. If I look at this offshore, because
21 I'm running this resolution process across all
22 of the data, I can actually identify when there
23 are other connections to this account or this
24 business externally from the transaction
25 information. And one of them happens to be

1 Lindsay David, and, again, I'm selecting Lindsay
2 from here and saying add that to the network and
3 now I have an interesting connection between the
4 bad, badder part of the network at the top and
5 Michael at the bottom. Essentially both of
6 these individuals is receiving money from this
7 external corporation in a high-risk
8 jurisdiction.

9 And the third thing that we've got in here
10 if you're looking at transactions is George
11 Lewis. So adding George to here would show that
12 actually we had some interesting matching
13 between ICIJ and inexpensive postcodes and now
14 we can see that actually George is receiving
15 money from this external entity Offshore
16 Incorporated Limited. And as we can see here
17 it's also flagging that it is an ICIJ, so it's
18 raising the suspicion level, and I can bring in
19 that piece into the view.

20 So as part of the investigation, you can
21 see that we have started with some referential
22 linkages between corporate registry information
23 and other sources that shows that there are
24 potential connections. When we start to include
25 things like financial transactions we actually

1 start to identify a more collusive nature
2 because they are all not only are they linked by
3 reference information, they're all receiving
4 money from this entity Offshore Incorporated
5 which is outside of the jurisdiction.

6 So this would definitely warrant further
7 investigation. And some of the things you might
8 do here is go well, how recent is this activity?
9 So there are some features down here like the
10 timeline that would allow you to determine when
11 companies or data starts to appear on this
12 network view. So we can scale it all the way
13 back to 1993, right, where we have an Offshore
14 Incorporations being founded, so founded a long
15 time ago. We can see here that Lindsay opens
16 her first account. We can then see here some
17 ICIJ references to Tobias, Tobias opening some
18 businesses at the top over here. A kind of long
19 gap and then AT Building Services fires up
20 connections to Michael and George. We have then
21 the other offshore accounts being opened up. We
22 then can see some more 2011, we can get that Dow
23 Jones record, and then we can move into the
24 financial transactions that happened in 2017 to
25 complete the picture. So here you can see how

1 this network is built up over time and with all
2 of these things, right, there could be
3 coincidences in the data, so the fact that, you
4 know, this address is linking to all of these,
5 well, if Michael wasn't there with George at the
6 same time, like that link is broken, and being
7 able to see that through a timeline perspective
8 is very useful to understanding whether these
9 are valid or invalid connections.

10 And that's where I wanted to conclude.

11 Q With some of the names that we're seeing on the
12 diagram here, I was waiting to see when the
13 banana stand would pop up. Thank you for that
14 demonstration. It's very helpful to see how
15 this works in action. I think we can finish off
16 with that and so perhaps I'll transfer -- I'll
17 suggest that we transfer the screen-sharing
18 capabilities back to Madam Registrar. Thank
19 you.

20 So I just had one last question for the
21 panel. And that was there are other platforms,
22 other softwares that are doing similar things.
23 It's not a process that's only limited to
24 Quantexa; is that right?

25 A (AB) That's right. So there are many

Alexon Bell (for the commission)
Peter Dent (for the commission)
Beth Dewitt (for the commission)
David Stewart (for the commission)
Exam by Ms. Rose

1 technologies out there that look at this in a
2 slightly different way. They will -- and I'm
3 sure you may have seen some graph-like views
4 with that. I think where Quantexa is different
5 is the integration of networks with this entity
6 resolution capability, and the importance of
7 entity resolution is becoming more apparent
8 especially when you have privacy requirements
9 sharing across jurisdictions or in effect
10 different institutions by having entity
11 resolution essentially remove data sets from a
12 network view. What we're seeing with other
13 technologies around like graph databases -- you
14 may have heard of those -- is you build the
15 graph on the data that you can see. So if
16 you've got three sources but any user can only
17 see two of them, that means I have to have three
18 different network views, three different graphs,
19 because I cannot show one source to another
20 user. Entity resolution solves that problem by
21 saying well, actually for you, Alexon, you can't
22 make those connections or see them.

23 MS. ROSE: Right. Thank you very much.

24 Mr. Commissioner, those are my questions for
25 these witnesses. I might suggest now would be

Alexon Bell (for the commission)
Peter Dent (for the commission)
Beth Dewitt (for the commission)
David Stewart (for the commission)
Exam by Ms. Rose

1 an appropriate time for us to take the 15-minute
2 morning break.

3 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I think that's a good
4 suggestion, Ms. Rose. We'll take 15 minutes.
5 Thank you.

6 THE REGISTRAR: This hearing is adjourned for a
7 15-minute recess until 10:34 a.m.

8 **(WITNESSES STOOD DOWN)**

9 **(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 10:19 A.M.)**

10 **(PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 10:33 A.M.)**

11 **ALEXON BELL, a witness**
12 **for the commission,**
13 **affirmed.**

14 **PETER DENT, a witness**
15 **for the commission,**
16 **affirmed.**

17 **BETH DEWITT, a witness**
18 **for the commission,**
19 **affirmed.**

20 **DAVID STEWART, a witness**
21 **for the commission,**
22 **affirmed.**

23 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you for waiting. The hearing
24 is resumed. Mr. Commissioner.

25 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Yes,

Alexon Bell (for the commission)
Peter Dent (for the commission)
Beth Dewitt (for the commission)
David Stewart (for the commission)
Exam by Ms. Herbst

1 now I'll call on Ms. Herbst on behalf of the Law
2 Society of British Columbia, who has been
3 allocated 10 minutes.

4 MS. HERBST: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner and thank
5 you, panel.

6 **EXAMINATION BY MS. HERBST:**

7 Q My name is Ludmila Herbst, as Mr. Commissioner
8 said, from the Law Society of British
9 Columbia -- or representing the Law Society of
10 British Columbia, and I just have a few
11 questions about your very interesting
12 presentation.

13 Now, in your presentation slides, which are
14 exhibit 667 -- although I don't think we need to
15 turn to them -- the title or the subheading at
16 least is "Application of Networks to Detect and
17 Mitigate Organized Crime." Is organized crime
18 something you equate with the kind of financial
19 crime you're interested in detecting?

20 A (PD) Sorry, it is, yes.

21 Q Okay. Okay. And we certainly benefitted this
22 morning from the collaboration between Deloitte
23 and Quantexa in terms of putting together the
24 presentation. Do Deloitte and Quantexa have a
25 longer working relationship as well?

1 sometimes on the wishes of a particular customer
2 with different applications that we might
3 traditionally think as competitors.

4 Q Okay. Well, thank you very much, and, again,
5 including for the interesting presentation.

6 Those are my questions.

7 MS. HERBST: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

8 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Herbst.

9 I'll now call on Mr. Usher on behalf of the
10 Society of Notaries Public of British Columbia,
11 who has been allocated five minutes.

12 MR. USHER: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

13 **EXAMINATION BY MR. USHER:**

14 Q I'm wondering if the panel can comment on some
15 costs and barriers to implementation. I'm
16 assuming there are costs, it's probably
17 significant ones, for the acquisition, the use,
18 the implementation of this software and how
19 those measure up against the potential benefits.
20 So over to you.

21 A (DS) I'll respond to that. Thank you very much
22 for the question. I think there are certainly
23 costs in, as you allude to, when you start
24 aggregating different data sets that may be
25 owned or possessed by or controlled by different

1 entities. I think some of the research in the
2 market when you start looking at what we'll call
3 big data and where, you know, how you could
4 aggregate such information, there's information
5 that would suggest that whilst there's initial
6 outlay in setup, I guess the financial benefits
7 and the value of such structures return greater
8 return for the investment that you make
9 initially. So if that's reducing, as Mr. Bell
10 pointed out in his example, perhaps when you go
11 to one screen and that data aggregation cuts out
12 a lot of time in compiling information for
13 investigators, so whilst there's initial outlays
14 there's also offsets to those costs.

15 Q And have you got examples of where this has been
16 used in cases leading to prosecutions in
17 commercial crime and money laundering in
18 particular?

19 A (DS) I'm not able to -- I don't have line of
20 sight to answer that question, unfortunately.

21 Q Perhaps Mr. Bell does?

22 A (AB) Hello. Am I back?

23 Q Yes. Mr. Bell, do you have any comments on the
24 use of your software or can you give us any
25 examples of the implementation of this software

1 that has been used in cases such as money
2 laundering?

3 A (AB) Sorry, am I back now? Ron, apologies. It
4 froze at the most inappropriate time halfway
5 through your question. Could you repeat it,
6 please.

7 Q No problem. We'll all just live with the Zoom
8 and the technology. Thank you.

9 I was simply asking if you have any stories
10 for us or of the use of your software in a
11 successful prosecution of money laundering and
12 other financial crime.

13 A (AB) I don't know about prosecution. I do
14 know -- so in the banks there's a process of
15 disclosure under AML regulations, Suspicious
16 Activity Reports and the like. So I do know of
17 cases where we have found connections in data
18 that would meet that organization's level of
19 suspicion to allow them to disclose that
20 suspicion to the regulator. So again, in the
21 AML world it's not a fact, it's a suspicion that
22 something might be suspicious, and that's what
23 the banks are using our software to help them
24 determine. It meets their own internal
25 governance and requirements to allow them to

1 disclose something to a regulator. And I've
2 witnessed investigations across different
3 organizations into various forms of organized
4 crime, be that human trafficking, wildlife,
5 counterterrorist financing. There's all those
6 sorts of use cases that we have seen our
7 software used to detect.

8 Q Can you give us examples of governments or
9 government agencies such as law enforcement that
10 are using the software?

11 A (AB) I'm not allowed to give any names. We do
12 have a government institution that is working
13 with us on a project.

14 Q Any in Canada?

15 A We have a customer in Canada, but it's not a
16 government one.

17 Q Thank you. So what's the barrier to this?
18 You've described the complexity of these data
19 structures. Can you just help us out. What are
20 the biggest barriers that you think would be
21 faced in implementing such a solution in British
22 Columbia?

23 A (PD) One barrier would be legislation to allow
24 various agencies to share data with each other.
25 That would be an example of a barrier to the use

1 appearing on behalf of the BC Civil Liberties
2 Association. My first questions relate to the
3 real estate intelligence hub and who would have
4 access to that hub? On page 4 of the
5 PowerPoint, I don't think we need to go there,
6 but it refers to the fact that users could
7 include the regulator, department and law
8 enforcement, and I was wondering which
9 regulators and departments were contemplated for
10 this product.

11 A (PD) Those were basically presented for
12 demonstration purposes only without a view that
13 they would necessarily be included or involved
14 in the outlay of the design. Ultimately it
15 would be the decision of the owner of the
16 database or the aggregator or the data as to who
17 would be included and how that was going to be
18 designed under what framework by the government.
19 That would be how I respond to it, but
20 Ms. Dewitt, you may have something to add.

21 (BD) No, I would agree. I think it actually
22 comes down to the parties who form the agreement
23 to participate in this type of intelligence hub
24 and then rules are designed based on that.

25 Q Thank you. Page 4 also of the slide show also

1 refers to law enforcement as a user, so is the
2 idea that law enforcement would have full access
3 to the information in the hub?

4 A (PD) That, again, would be determined by the
5 designers and stakeholders in the hub as to what
6 thresholds of access each would be provided.
7 Law enforcement may have more access or not.
8 Again, that would be a decision for the owners
9 or designers.

10 (BD) I'm going to add to that that the
11 referenced architect behind what the framework
12 would be to govern things like users and access
13 and who has what and can do what would also be
14 related back to whatever is enabled under
15 different types of laws and regulations in terms
16 of the type of data certain actors would have
17 access to.

18 Q Thank you. So ostensibly law enforcement would
19 have some access to data in this hub without
20 first being required to obtain a warrant. Is
21 that an accurate description?

22 A (PD) I cannot answer that. I would not know.

23 Q Okay. Thank you. Has Deloitte or Quantexa
24 obtained a legal opinion on the compliance of
25 the structure of the hub or a similar database

1 with section 8 of the charter?

2 A (PD) So I won't -- I mean, I'll let Alexon speak
3 for Quantexa, but I'm not aware of us, you know,
4 doing that sort of background research. Again,
5 this was a -- this was a presentation for
6 demonstrative purposes only.

7 (AB) We have not done anything of the sort
8 at Quantexa.

9 Q Thank you. But you would agree that doing that
10 sort of thinking before implementing this type
11 of hub would be quite important given that law
12 enforcement and government agencies would be
13 provided access to very private information?

14 A (BD) Again, I think if you refer back to the
15 concept of the framework and the governance that
16 we would want to establish there, part of that
17 process is to do that due diligence analysis.
18 So an analysis can be both in terms of a privacy
19 legal review, a privacy impact assessment that
20 would look at permissions, data flows and line
21 that up against legal requirements. Another
22 piece of it would be required security controls
23 based on established frameworks within the
24 province or in Canada, again, dependent on the
25 actors in play. And then the third element to

1 that would be what additional analysis would be
2 required, be it from a purely legal perspective
3 or from a broader ethical perspective. And I
4 think if you look holistically at those
5 different components that come together, that's
6 where, for example, a recommendation can be made
7 that we would want to have that type of analysis
8 done. And again, that would be the driven by
9 the entity who is ultimately leading this
10 intelligence hub.

11 Q Thank you. My next questions are about data
12 aggregation, so the type of data that could be
13 in this hub. My understanding is that it could
14 include internal data, so from various
15 government agencies as well as external data.
16 Is that accurate?

17 A (AB) That's accurate.

18 (DS) Yes, that's accurate.

19 Q So for the external data, I understand that that
20 would include public data such as news articles.

21 A (AB) Correct.

22 Q Could it include other public data, including
23 open source intelligence?

24 A (AB) Yes, it could.

25 Q Sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt you.

1 A (AB) Yes, it could, if that was the wish of the
2 hub to include that information in it, then yes,
3 it could get visibility of that information.

4 Q And open-sourced intelligence that could include
5 social media, it could include public government
6 data, professional and academic publications,
7 those are some examples of open source
8 intelligence?

9 A (AB) So it does depend on a couple of things,
10 which is how does that data match to more
11 structured and well-recognized information. So
12 there would have to be a governance process in
13 what sources could be included and at what
14 stages in the overall process.

15 Q Okay. Thank you. There's also a reference in
16 the slide show to data related to financial wire
17 transfers. So would it be possible for the hub
18 to include data from financial institutions or
19 about financial transactions?

20 A (AB) Again, that would be a decision of the hub
21 as to whether that data could be included. That
22 data could be partitioned off into a separate
23 area that only specific users or government
24 departments could get access to.

25 Q Thank you. And because we looked at those types

1 of transactions in the demonstration today, I'm
2 contemplating that that may be something that
3 people would want to be part of the hub. I'm
4 just wondering if there's been any thinking in
5 terms of how that data would be obtained.

6 A (PD) That would be -- that would be data that
7 would be obtained through memorandums of
8 understanding or, you know, any sort of
9 agreements between departments that they could
10 share that data. Again, this is for the
11 designers of whatever this platform would look
12 like and it's really not for us to say what
13 would be included or excluded.

14 Q Thank you. My next question is for Mr. Bell. I
15 was wondering if Quantexa ever purchases data
16 from data brokers or add tech companies and if
17 so, what kinds of data?

18 A (AB) No, we don't purchase any data from any of
19 those sources. So when we are deployed, it is
20 down to the organization that has our software
21 to choose the data that that goes into it. We
22 make no recommendations or anything like that.

23 Q Oh, thank you. That's helpful. So Quantexa
24 provides the software and then it would be up to
25 the owner of the hub to decide what type of data

1 to include within it?

2 A (AB) Correct, yes.

3 Q Thank you. Okay. So we've talked about many
4 different types of data that that could be
5 included in the hub, understanding that the
6 designer of the hub would be making these
7 judgment calls, but is it fair to say that by
8 aggregating these types of data, we would
9 ostensibly be able to learn quite a bit about an
10 individual including their name, age, gender,
11 location, telephone number, potentially
12 information like their marital status or race?
13 Would you agree with that?

14 A (AB) I think that all comes down to the
15 governance. So the software can essentially be
16 what's called federated, so it can run in
17 different data centres and only connect across
18 them and share the information that it's allowed
19 to share. So the governance that sits around
20 what we can exchange is really important as to
21 how much information can be known about an
22 individual or a property. So gender, for
23 example, has not figured in any of the
24 demonstrations. We don't need to know gender to
25 make those linkages. I don't need to know what

1 car you drive or anything like that. I need to
2 know factual information around the
3 investigation which is corporate information, so
4 are you a director of a business, do you own a
5 property, are you on a watch list.

6 (BD) I think as well when you take a privacy
7 by design approach and layer in good ethical
8 governance what you're doing there is you're
9 setting up specific principles around what you
10 will allow from the data. And so while there's
11 the potential for inferences, if you establish
12 rules at the outset that say, these are the
13 types of data that I need or I don't need to
14 answer these types of questions that I'm trying
15 to investigate and test out through the
16 intelligence hub, then you're actually able to
17 put some guardrails and some controls around and
18 limit, therefore, the broader connections that
19 you can make.

20 So I think what's important is to go back
21 to the starting place to say what are the risks
22 in, you know, a free access to all different
23 types of data and how do we limit those risks
24 through taking an appropriate and proportional
25 approach to the type of data that we're going to

1 make available within the intelligence hub.

2 Q Thank you. I would now like to take the panel
3 to a document. Madam Registrar, if you could
4 please pull up a report that I circulated called
5 "To Surveil and Predict." Are the panelists
6 familiar with this report?

7 A (PD) Yes. We did -- I think all of us received
8 that document last week.

9 MS. MAGONET: Thank you. Mr. Commissioner, could I
10 please have this marked as the next exhibit?

11 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Very well. That will be the
12 next exhibit.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 668, Mr. Commissioner.

14 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

15 **EXHIBIT 668: To Surveil and Predict -**
16 **publication of University of Toronto -**
17 **International Human Rights Program - 2020**

18 MS. MAGONET: Madam Registrar, could you please go to
19 page 75 of this report. Thank you. If you
20 could scroll down a bit.

21 Q I just wanted to take the panel to a quote from
22 this report. Sorry -- yes, I have the right
23 spot. So this report is looking at algorithmic
24 policing in Canada, and while it's focused on
25 policing, it does talk about the use of

1 algorithmic predictions and other contexts. And
2 here the authors of the report write:

3 "Individuals retain a unique expectation
4 of privacy from law enforcement agencies.
5 This expectation means that individuals
6 retain a right to the protection of their
7 privacy from law enforcement even if
8 information has already been disclosed or
9 made public for other purposes to non-law
10 enforcement actors."

11 If you could scroll down a bit, Madam Registrar.

12 "While individuals -- "

13 If you could continue scrolling down. My
14 apologies.

15 "-- do inevitably lose some degree of
16 control over the personal information when
17 it is shared with others, they may
18 reasonably expect that the information
19 will not be divulged further to (or
20 collected by) law enforcement."

21 Would you agree that the hub undermines this
22 protection by potentially allowing law
23 enforcement to access sensitive information
24 without obtaining a warrant first?

25 A (BD) I'm not sure that I can answer that fully

1 because, again, we're doing this based on a
2 demonstration. So the rules would need to be
3 set around what law enforcement will have access
4 to or won't have access to, and again, that will
5 be dependent on what they're legally allowed to
6 have access to based on the laws in place and
7 the type of data that's put into the hub.

8 Q Thank you. So that was a question about charter
9 limits on privacy infringements, but my next
10 question relates to privacy legislation. So the
11 10 privacy principles of fair information
12 practices that underlie Canadian privacy
13 legislation [indiscernible] disclosure and
14 retention of information must generally be
15 limited to the purposes for which it was
16 collected. How can the real estate intelligence
17 hub respect this principle when it aggregates
18 and shares data collected by many different
19 bodies for many different purposes?

20 A (BD) That's a good question. I think in part
21 it's going to go back to -- and, again, this
22 would be part of the analysis that one would
23 want to do when it starts to compile what the
24 intelligence hub will actually do, is to
25 understand a -- the original purpose statements

1 that were used when data was originally
2 collected, what the enabling laws are to permit
3 those original data collections, what the uses
4 were that was defined under those data
5 collections, and be able to take a step back and
6 do an analysis on what would be reasonable and
7 expected based on what is permitted. So when
8 you conduct something like a privacy impact
9 assessment, what you are evaluating against
10 those 10 privacy principles which form
11 schedule 1 of *PIPEDA*, but then also form the
12 basis of most of our provincial laws as well
13 from a privacy perspective, is that what your
14 going to do is evaluate the permissibility of
15 the collection use and disclosure against a set
16 of purposes. Something like the intelligence
17 hub should never go live without that type of
18 analysis being done and the assurance being
19 provided that the right legal permissions are in
20 place. And if they're not in place, what
21 additional steps need to be taken. So that
22 could be around how it is you then limit access
23 to data, limit the types of data or not allow
24 specific data sets at all.

25 Q Thank you. My next question relates to another

1 of these 10 principles and it's the principle
2 that requires that consent must generally be
3 obtained to use, collect, retain and disclose
4 data. But you would agree that when an
5 individual consents to disclosing their data to
6 a land title registry they're hardly consenting
7 to their data being aggregated with multiple
8 other sources of data to create a more intimate
9 picture of them and then for that picture to be
10 shared with multiple regulators and law
11 enforcement?

12 A (BD) I think what we are actually looking at
13 here is a level of transparency that needs to
14 exist. So when you go and you consent to
15 something, you're consenting to something based
16 on a set of information that you're provided
17 around what's going to happen with your data and
18 for what purposes. And so there needs to be a
19 clear level of a transparency, accountability
20 and proportionality built into that. And from
21 that individual should have a reasonable should
22 have a reasonable expectation around what's
23 going to happen with their information. As we
24 start to use data more and more in this
25 connected way, increasingly notice statements

1 need to evolve to talk about this increasing way
2 in which data is going to be connected and used
3 to understand certain attributes or certain
4 scenarios.

5 So I think that there's two things that need
6 to happen. One is within the framework itself
7 of the intelligence hub, there needs to be
8 questions around what those original notice
9 statements said and the individuals, what the
10 individuals would have read. There also was a
11 wider conversation that I think is taking place
12 around what is reasonable for individuals to
13 expect, and given the new types of things that
14 we can do with a data through analytics how do
15 we continue to be transparent and inform and
16 educate.

17 Q Thank you. My next questions are I think maybe
18 best directed to Mr. Bell. And they're about
19 the risk scoring element of the real estate hub.
20 And I was wondering, Mr. Bell, if you're aware
21 of research raising concerns about the ways in
22 which automated decision making and AI can
23 perpetuate discrimination and bias?

24 A (AB) I am aware of that research, yes. I've
25 read about it.

1 Q And I was wondering what steps, if any, does
2 Quantexa take to ensure that discrimination and
3 bias aren't perpetuated by the AI used in its
4 software?

5 A (BD) Yeah, so I think there's a demarkation
6 between what Quantexa is doing and an AI machine
7 learning platform. So Quantexa is essentially
8 making connections in data, and those
9 connections can then be surfaced to an AI
10 machine learning engine. So we are essentially
11 not the AI that's making that determination.
12 We're finding the connections, and we're
13 determining the strength of those connections.
14 It's then down to the governance process of
15 whatever modelling technique or software that is
16 used by the organization to put that model
17 through an ethical AI framework that is
18 compatible with the various requirements that
19 they need to adhere to.

20 MS. MAGONET: Thank you. Mr. Commissioner, I see
21 that my time is up. I have just a few more
22 questions and I was wondering if I could seek
23 your indulgence to have maybe five more minutes.

24 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, that's fine, Ms. Magonet.

25 MS. MAGONET: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

1 Q Mr. Bell, are you particularly aware of research
2 in the realms of predictive policing about AIs
3 that overpredict that racialized people will
4 commit crimes?

5 A (AB) No, I'm not aware.

6 Q Okay. Thank you. I have just two more --
7 sorry, just two or three more questions for you.
8 They may be best directed to Mr. Bell, but I'm
9 not certain. I was wondering how much it would
10 cost BC to implement the real estate
11 intelligence hub.

12 A (PD) If I could, I'll let Mr. Bell respond as
13 well after myself, but a lot of -- to say what
14 the cost would be is very difficult because it
15 would depend on the amounts of data that are
16 being aggregated and therefore the more data
17 that is being aggregated from different sources,
18 the greater the complexity and the greater the
19 cost. So as we discussed this is a scaleable
20 capability. The point would be that what we're
21 trying to do is start small and then as more
22 data becomes available you could start small and
23 then as more data becomes available then
24 integrate that data as and when the process to
25 allow it to happen occurs.

1 (AB) Yeah, and if I step back and I just
2 look at kind of projects in general, there is a
3 component of cost which is software, and that
4 might not just be Quantexa software. There's a
5 component cost which is data, which is split on
6 both external data spend on subscriptions but
7 also the kind of internal marshalling of data
8 and then there's a kind of process piece, so
9 training of investigators, setting up governance
10 frameworks, training on the software, et cetera.
11 So there's large, you know, components of cost
12 that would vary based upon the scale that Peter
13 has talked about. So if you start smaller the
14 overall aggregate cost is smaller. As you start
15 to increase componentry, data sources, et
16 cetera, then costs will go up accordingly.

17 Q I totally understand that there are many
18 variables at play, but is anyone on the panel
19 able to give a ballpark or a high or low figure?

20 A (PD) It's very difficult to give out a figure
21 like that. We're not talking tens of millions
22 of dollars, at least on a small scale -- a
23 smaller scale where you're only integrating
24 certain data or a small number of data sources
25 together. So -- but you know, it could be in

1 the high hundreds of thousands of dollars to get
2 things started. But again, it's a difficult
3 question to answer because in many ways I'm just
4 guessing because I don't know what the
5 parameters are that an intelligence hub would
6 need to -- that, you know, the designers would
7 want to have in place.

8 Q Thank you. Mr. Bell, are you able to give us an
9 estimate of how much Quantexa would make from a
10 contract with BC to establish the real estate
11 intelligence hub?

12 A (AB) I can't -- I don't deal with the commercial
13 aspects of Quantexa. I deal much more with the
14 kind of solutions side. But we have a flexible
15 framework of licensing cost for the software, so
16 if you wanted to, we could work out what that is
17 across a number of parameters.

18 Q And it's my understanding that as of July of
19 last year, Quantexa had raised over \$90 million.

20 A (AB) I think we raised \$65 million in Series C
21 funding last year.

22 MS. MAGONET: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Commissioner,
23 those are my questions.

24 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Magonet.

25 I'll now call on Mr. Westell for the

1 Canadian Bar Association and the Criminal
2 Defence Advocacy Society. Mr. Westell has been
3 allocated five minutes.

4 MR. WESTELL: Mr. Commissioner, I'll concede my time
5 in the circumstances. Thank you very much.

6 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Westell.

7 And finally Mr. Rauch-Davis for
8 Transparency International Coalition, who has
9 been allocated 10 minutes.

10 MR. RAUCH-DAVIS: Thank you.

11 **EXAMINATION BY MR. RAUCH-DAVIS:**

12 Q Mr. Dent, can you hear me okay? I believe
13 you're on mute.

14 A (PD) Yes, I can hear you.

15 Q Okay, great. I understood part of the overview
16 evidence you gave this morning was that you
17 expect the Land Owner Transparency Registry to
18 be able to provide useful data for software like
19 Quantexa. Do I have that right?

20 A (PD) That is correct, yes.

21 Q Yeah, and then throughout the slides in the
22 presentation this morning there were repeated
23 references to corporate information, corporate
24 registry data that ought to be accessed for
25 Quantexa and you gave evidence on the beneficial

1 ownership panel, and so my question to you is I
2 wonder if you might be able to explain how a
3 publicly accessible corporate beneficial
4 ownership registry might assist or facilitate
5 the utility of the software that has been
6 presented this morning.

7 A (PD) Well, it would allow for greater
8 transparency with respect to the data. So it
9 would make making the links or the connections
10 between the data that is housed, for example, in
11 the land ownership transparency registry with
12 the data that is housed in BC Registries, for
13 example, and therefore give a more transparent
14 view as to the ultimate beneficial owner of the
15 land ownership but also the corporate ownership.

16 Q Is it fair to say that it would create
17 efficiencies within the software itself, within
18 the connections within the linking?

19 A (PD) I think it's fair to say. Mr. Bell,
20 correct me if I'm wrong, but I think it's fair
21 to say that the more data that goes into the
22 software or into the platform, the greater the
23 degree of linkages or connections that can be
24 made as well as the testing of the voracity of
25 that data.

1 Q Yes. And maybe I'll turn to Mr. Bell. Do you
2 have any input on this topic?

3 A (AB) I would agree with Mr. Dent. So if the
4 data in the beneficial ownership database is
5 verified, that means that the nature of the
6 connections are more significant and more
7 accurate. And that can lead to a multitude of
8 things, right, making connections that we
9 couldn't see before but also just more quickly
10 validating that connections are true.

11 Q And so in your experience, Mr. Bell, in
12 jurisdictions that Quantexa is operating where
13 there is a corporate beneficial ownership
14 registry like the UK, could you expand on the
15 utility of that registry in the software in that
16 jurisdiction?

17 A (AB) So if the corporate registry is available
18 and an organization can consume it, they can
19 start to identify connections as we saw in the
20 slides between their data and that registry
21 information. If that data is also available to
22 international organizations, then they could get
23 some information on transactions between their
24 country and the UK companies that were on that
25 registry. So there are a multitude of uses on

1 being able to link that information.

2 There is I suppose another use case, which
3 is then the verification of information that is
4 presented to you. So if I'm in Canada and I say
5 I am a director of Quantexa, I provide
6 Quantexa's credentials to you. Having access to
7 the UK company's house from Canada would allow
8 you to validate that I am actually who I say I
9 am and Quantexa is a legitimate business. So I
10 think there are a few things we could do with
11 that data.

12 MR. RAUCH-DAVIS: All right. Thank you. Those are
13 my questions for this panel.

14 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Rauch-Davis.

15 Anything arising, Ms. Magonet?

16 MS. MAGONET: Nothing arising, Mr. Commissioner.

17 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Mr. Usher?

18 MR. USHER: Nothing arising, Mr. Commissioner.

19 THE COMMISSIONER: Ms. Herbst?

20 MS. HERBST: I apologize. I had not unmuted myself.

21 Nothing arising. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

22 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Herbst. Ms. Rose?

23 MS. ROSE: Nothing from me, Mr. Commissioner. Thank
24 you.

25 THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I'd like to thank the panel

1 members, Mr. Bell, Mr. Dent, Ms. Dewitt and
2 Mr. Stewart for educating us about the
3 impressive reach of technology to explore what I
4 think are inherently secretive offences and of
5 course the need to balance that impressive
6 technology against the imperative of protecting
7 the constitutional and privacy rights of British
8 Columbians. It's a very interesting discussion
9 and I think one which will help inform the
10 commission in its final report. So thank you
11 all for the time you've taken to participate
12 with us. You are now all excused from further
13 evidence.

14 **(WITNESSES EXCUSED)**

15 THE COMMISSIONER: And I think we will need to stand
16 down briefly, Ms. Rose, to bring the next
17 witness on board. Is that the case?

18 MS. ROSE: I'm not sure, but I do see my colleague
19 Ms. Patel here. Perhaps she has more insights
20 than I do.

21 IT SUPPORT: Yes, Mr. Commissioner, we do need to
22 stand down to change logistics.

23 THE COMMISSIONER: Why don't we take five minutes,
24 then.

25 THE WITNESS: (BD) Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

1 (PD) Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

2 THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is stood down for five
3 minutes until 11:18 a.m.

4 **(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:13 A.M.)**

5 **(PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 11:17 A.M.)**

6 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you for waiting. The hearing
7 is resumed, Mr. Commissioner.

8 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

9 Yes, Ms. Patel.

10 MS. PATEL: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. Before
11 having our next witness affirmed, I just thought
12 I'd bring up a matter of timing. I don't
13 anticipate being a full two hours with this
14 witness, but there are a number of requests for
15 cross-examination, and I've just canvassed
16 counsel in the break as to whether there's any
17 issue with sitting until 1 o'clock or 1:15, and
18 I thought I should probably also canvass you to
19 see if any issue arises.

20 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. No, that's fine, Ms. Patel.
21 I did see the chat conversation, so I am aware
22 of the prospect that we might go a little late.
23 Thank you.

24 MS. PATEL: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. Mr.
25 Commissioner, our next witness is Mr. Brad

1 Rudnicki. He's an employee of BCLC and he has
2 chosen to affirm.

3 **BRAD RUDNICKI, a witness**
4 **called for the**
5 **commission, affirmed.**

6 THE REGISTRAR: Please state your full name and spell
7 your first name and last name for the record.

8 THE WITNESS: Bradley Allen Rudnicki. B-r-a-d-l-e-y,
9 Rudnicki, R-u-d-n-i-c-k-i.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you.

11 **EXAMINATION BY MS. PATEL:**

12 Q Thank you, Mr. Rudnicki.

13 Can we please, Madam Registrar, have
14 Mr. Rudnicki's CV.

15 Mr. Rudnicki, do you recognize this as the
16 CV that you provided to the commission?

17 A Yes.

18 Q May not have caught that.

19 A Yes, I do.

20 Q Okay. Thank you. Are you able to hear me all
21 right?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Okay. Just to please make sure when I've asked
24 you a question, even though we have video, make
25 sure that you answer verbally for the benefit of

1 the reporter.

2 So, Mr. Rudnicki, can you please describe
3 what your current position is with BCLC.

4 A My title is AML Intelligence Specialist and I
5 support the AML unit in a variety of ways
6 conducting analysis, supporting programs and
7 things of that nature.

8 Q Okay. And what's your training when it comes to
9 intelligence and AML analysis?

10 A I have a bachelor in criminal intelligence
11 analysis from BCIT and I also hold ACAMS
12 certification as an anti-money laundering
13 specialist.

14 Q Thank you. How long have you been with BCLC?

15 A That's eight years now, I guess. Going on eight
16 years.

17 Q And has your role at BCLC evolved since you
18 joined the organization?

19 A Yes. I originally was there as a contractor and
20 that led to a job where I became the AML
21 Intelligence Analyst, and as the unit grew over
22 time, I got more responsibilities and eventually
23 was promoted up to AML Intelligence Specialist.

24 Q And do you currently have any staff working with
25 you in your unit?

1 A Yes. There are two other analysts and a junior
2 analyst.

3 Q And are any of them direct reports to you?

4 A No. I have no direct reports.

5 MS. PATEL: Can we scroll down, please, Madam
6 Registrar.

7 Q And I'm just noting here on your résumé you've
8 got "Vancouver Police Department, Work
9 Placement, major crimes." Can you just describe
10 what that work was.

11 A It was a job placement out of school. It was
12 originally for a month and I kept getting
13 extended because I was doing a good job, I
14 guess, and learned a whole bunch of stuff,
15 assisted the other analysts and got some
16 experience in that realm.

17 MS. PATEL: Mr. Commissioner, I was going to ask if
18 we could please mark this as the next exhibit,
19 and I'm afraid that I've lost track of the
20 numbers.

21 THE COMMISSIONER: So have I, but I'm sure Madam
22 Registrar is on top of that.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. Exhibit 669 Mr. Commissioner.

24 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

25 **EXHIBIT 669: Curriculum Vitae of Brad Rudnicki**

1 MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, we can take this down
2 now. Thank you.

3 Q I wanted to go back to the work that you are
4 currently doing at BCLC, Mr. Rudnicki. Can you
5 describe what is the -- first of all, what's the
6 need for AML intelligence?

7 A As it relates to this, there's a lot of things
8 that we look into. So we look into
9 transactions, trends that are happening with
10 certain types of transactions. In particular I
11 guess what we're looking at is the due diligence
12 on patrons, and that is one of the main things
13 that relates to this.

14 Q Okay. And just for context, when you say
15 "relates to this," are you -- what are you
16 referring to?

17 A The research that was conducted on players that
18 came to the casino and some of the connections
19 that were found in that process.

20 Q Okay. You're previewing some of the evidence
21 we're going to be hearing about, which is, as
22 you say, some research that you've conducted on
23 casino patrons. And just getting back to the
24 AML purpose of that research, why does BCLC need
25 to do background research on patrons? What's

1 the AML purpose of that?

2 A As per FINTRAC guidelines, they stipulate to
3 conduct know your customer due diligence type
4 inquiries on the players that are coming into
5 your business. There's a variety of ways to
6 look at that. Account-based gaming and/or
7 high-risk business relationships, and we are
8 required as per FINTRAC to conduct these know
9 your customer exercises in order to assess risk.

10 Q Okay. And is it with every customer of a casino
11 that you do these intelligence exercises, or are
12 there selection criteria that bring a person to
13 your attention rather than one customer as
14 opposed to another?

15 A There are a variety of ways that would lead to
16 conducting a report, some research. One of the
17 primary ones is if someone opens up a players
18 gaming fund account, a PGF account, we'll
19 conduct the information or the research on them
20 to get some information on them in that
21 instance, and then other -- others come from
22 requests from management essentially based off
23 of potentially investigations. It could be for
24 a variety of things.

25 Q And when you're conducting your research, what

1 type of -- how do you go about it and what are
2 the tools that you have access to?

3 A We start with looking at things like court
4 documents in British Columbia, so we'll look at
5 civil court records and we'll also look at
6 criminal charges that are available online and
7 the assessment of the patron and then we'll move
8 into cross-Canada court records and try to find
9 things of concern, adverse type documents in
10 that realm, and then we'll also look into
11 companies, so British Columbia registered
12 companies. We'll also look internationally for
13 companies based off of information that the
14 players have given to us. We'll also look into
15 assets in the real estate market that the player
16 may have based off of information they've given
17 to us, and so we'll research these types of
18 areas. And we also utilize some banking
19 standards type data files to -- as part of our
20 process to look for sanctioned players, like
21 terrorist watch list type lists, politically
22 exposed and adverse media. We use data files
23 for that as well as part of our check.

24 Q Are these -- are the data files or sources
25 you've just described, are these all publicly

1 available?

2 A Yes. Yes, many of them are publicly available.
3 We pay for them. Some of them are paid
4 services, and ...

5 Q So for instance, I understand that you have
6 access -- the same as any other member of the
7 public, to the LTSA registry. Is that correct?

8 A Correct.

9 Q And so when you're conducting a query on the
10 LTSA database, would you be paying per search
11 transaction like any other member of the public?

12 A Yes. We have an account set up and we pay per
13 transaction, per document to collect these types
14 of items if they are found.

15 Q And would the same -- is the same true of your
16 access to the corporate registry?

17 A Yes. The company registry land titles, BC
18 assessment, yep, they're all similar.

19 Q And you mentioned when you were listing data
20 sources, you mentioned a politically exposed
21 persons lists or terrorist watch lists. Are
22 those private databases?

23 A It's a data file that we purchase from a vendor,
24 which is common in the -- commonly used in the
25 banking sector, the financial sector, and we pay

1 to have access to that information.

2 Q Is it is that a subscription source?

3 A Yes. It's a subscription source, and they are a
4 conglomerate of many lists across the internet,
5 so a lot of open-source information. There are
6 400 plus lists that they're accessing to build
7 their data file and create profiles for
8 individuals for -- with available information,
9 which then we use in manual and automated
10 fashion to run and check people's names against
11 and then we review the potential hits that occur
12 in order to confirm if there is a match or not.

13 Q I think you mentioned confirming corporate
14 information. And of course there's a corporate
15 registry in British Columbia for companies
16 registered here, and there's a federal registry
17 for federally registered companies. Do you have
18 access to information for companies that are
19 incorporated outside of Canada?

20 A Yes. We tie into Dun & Bradstreet, essentially.
21 That's the international data source that we're
22 referencing when we're looking for international
23 companies related to players that may be in our
24 casino, and the information that they provide to
25 us, we utilize that as a source.

1 Q Again, is that a subscription-based service that
2 BCLC pays for?

3 A Yes.

4 Q So in terms of British Columbia-based data
5 sources, I think you mentioned the resource of
6 the land registry. Would that be a main source?

7 A Yes.

8 Q And also Court Services Online?

9 A Yes.

10 Q Okay. And the corporate registry?

11 A Yes.

12 Q And I think you mentioned as well BC Assessment.

13 A Correct.

14 Q Okay. Are there any British Columbia-based
15 registries or data repositories that you have
16 access to that I missed in that list there?

17 A I don't think so, no.

18 Q And of course BCLC keeps its own records and its
19 own information that you have access to in
20 conducting research on players; correct?

21 A Correct.

22 Q And when conducting background research on a
23 player, do you ever have access to law
24 enforcement information?

25 A Yes. We will exercise the information-sharing

1 agreement if there's something found that leads
2 us to ask those questions.

3 Q So it's not an automatic resource that you go
4 to?

5 A Correct.

6 Q And for how long have you been conducting this
7 kind of open-source research on BCLC customers
8 yourself?

9 A I would say for the past eight years. That was
10 one of the primary things when I first started
11 was to build the program and to figure out a way
12 to create these reports in order to assess risk.

13 Q Okay. And as you progressed in doing this work,
14 can you tell us about some of the observations
15 you were making -- I'm not asking about specific
16 players here; I'm just asking about observations
17 you were making at a trend level or a general
18 level about what you were seeing as a result of
19 that open-source research.

20 A As it relates to real estate?

21 Q Yeah. I was going to say let me give you a
22 little bit more of a narrow road. Yeah, in
23 relation to real estate.

24 A In general we would see -- we'd find interesting
25 things in regards to beneficial ownership. We

1 would see student, housewife, multimillion
2 dollar properties, et cetera, as these were the
3 players that were coming to our casino. So in
4 general there was some beneficial owner type
5 findings. And other findings did relate to
6 private mortgages that were being lent by
7 individuals, some of which were interesting in
8 the sense that they were linked to organized
9 crime.

10 Q Okay.

11 A And then some other ownership structures were
12 found relating to companies, individuals, land
13 titles and sometimes it was fairly complex. And
14 in general I would say those are the three
15 general areas.

16 Q So beneficial ownership issues, private
17 mortgages and ownership structures linked to
18 companies were the three main issues that you
19 were noticing?

20 A From time to time, yes.

21 Q Okay. And I'm going to go back -- I'm going to
22 go through each one. I just want to slow down a
23 little bit. With respect to beneficial
24 ownership -- and you made a mention of
25 occupations -- what was the issue or the trend

1 that you were observing with respect to
2 beneficial ownership information?

3 A That would -- generally that was -- we would see
4 occupations like housewife, student, and when we
5 would do our research into those players, we
6 would find them attached to multimillion dollar
7 houses and that would then further lead to the
8 research where we could perhaps link another
9 player in our database to one of those
10 addresses, which would then lead us to perhaps
11 connecting that to being the spouse of the
12 housewife or the parent of one of the students.
13 And that individual themselves wouldn't be
14 generally listed or they would be listed on land
15 titles. It really varies. There's a lot of
16 examples. But we would find connections like
17 that or we would find connections with companies
18 that were registered that would list these
19 addresses who were owned by these people, and
20 those companies were ran by other individuals.
21 So we would assume in some cases that that was
22 the spouse or parent, things of that nature.

23 Q So in a situation where you would -- I just want
24 to be clear on the source of information. When
25 you're looking at the information about the

1 ownership of a property, where are you getting
2 in kind of the process you've just described,
3 where would you be getting the information about
4 the occupation of the owner?

5 A The occupation of the owner was from our
6 database because they need to provide that as
7 per FINTRAC, occupation and company information.
8 And so we would use that. And then cross
9 reference it with the occupation and land
10 titles, for example, because they do collect
11 that.

12 Q That was my question, was whether the occupation
13 information came from your own internal files or
14 if that was derived from the land titles. So I
15 understand that you -- BCLC collects that
16 information from players but you could also
17 cross reference that to what's recorded in land
18 titles; is that correct?

19 A Correct.

20 Q And then your open-source research would allow
21 you to connect other individuals to properties
22 that they weren't -- they themselves weren't
23 listed as the owner, but perhaps somebody else
24 would be listed as the owner and you would --
25 what assumption or what conclusion would you

1 derive from that?

2 A Sometimes in our database we would have spouses
3 connected, and through the research we would see
4 that the female is on the land title or the
5 children on land titles, whereas the male was
6 not, but through the research you could see that
7 that is highly likely where the wealth is coming
8 from because of connections to companies that
9 most of the time were foreign.

10 Q And connections between companies and which
11 individual?

12 A The beneficial owner, essentially, which is what
13 it appeared to be. And again, it's not BCLC's
14 role to confirm who's the beneficial owner of
15 such things. It was just we're doing research
16 on players to get an idea of who we're dealing
17 with and trying to assess risk and looking for
18 adverse type findings and generally look for
19 their source of wealth to see if their level of
20 play at the casino aligns with assets we could
21 potentially link them to.

22 Q Because that was -- that would be an AML concern
23 of BCLC's is what's the source of wealth of a
24 player coming into the casino?

25 A Yes.

1 apparent use of private mortgages. So first of
2 all, how in conducting open-source research do
3 you go about identifying that there's a private
4 mortgage registered against a property?

5 A Under the charges, liens and titles section of
6 the land title, there's listings of mortgages,
7 liens, et cetera, and one of those was
8 mortgages. And they list the name of the lender
9 and commonly it's big banks and but then in some
10 cases it's an individual's name. Sometimes it's
11 a company, like a numbered company. But in
12 relation to the private mortgages, we were
13 mostly honed in on when it was a name of an
14 individual.

15 Q Okay. And just for context, my understanding is
16 when you search the LTSA database as a member of
17 the public, you can pull -- you can pull
18 someone's -- you can pull a title to a property;
19 correct?

20 A Correct.

21 Q And then on that title information, that
22 document will list both current and cancelled
23 mortgages; is that right?

24 A Yes.

25 Q And also perhaps certificates of pending

1 litigation or builders liens, also those types
2 of registrations?

3 A Correct.

4 Q Okay. And on that title document, does that
5 contain information, detailed information about
6 the mortgage itself?

7 A No.

8 Q So how do you go about getting information about
9 the mortgage itself?

10 A There's a reference number that can be entered
11 into the website and you can purchase that
12 document and then view further details about it.

13 Q It's a further document that you can get from
14 the LTSA website?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Okay. And was this the kind of research that
17 you were -- in your research is this the kind of
18 thing you were doing, following up with those
19 mortgage documents?

20 A For privately lent mortgages, yes. We had some
21 information, I guess, along the way that led us
22 to highlighting those as a -- it was more of an
23 indicator, I would say, of this could be
24 something unusual because previously we found
25 civil court records where the payment of the

1 mortgage didn't happen, and so people were taken
2 to court to repay these private mortgages.

3 Q Okay. And I'm going to return to the court
4 records in a moment, but just to finish the
5 description for the benefit of the Commissioner
6 to understand the information that's available,
7 when you purchase the mortgage form, the
8 mortgage information document from the LTSA,
9 typically what kind of information does that
10 document give you?

11 A It will provide to you the lender, the borrower,
12 the amount sometimes, the interest rate at which
13 the amount shall be paid back. It will also
14 list notaries that were involved in registering
15 of that mortgage or lawyers and in some cases if
16 the power of attorney was involved, that's also
17 on there.

18 Q And so does the mortgage document give you
19 information about the amount that was loaned?

20 A Yes. It will give you the amount that was
21 loaned, the date, things of that nature.

22 Q Okay. Does it tell you the interest rate that's
23 applicable?

24 A Yes, sometime it does.

25 Q Okay. And does it tell you when a loan is

1 repayable, when the principal is repayable?

2 A Yes. Sometimes it gives that information if
3 it's -- the payment schedule. Sometime it's not
4 on those documents, though.

5 Q Okay. And then just a minute ago you were
6 connecting mortgages to litigation that you were
7 finding, and I take it foreclosure petitions
8 relating to private mortgages. Is that the kind
9 of record you were looking at?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Okay. And can you tell us just about what you
12 were finding with respect to those court
13 records? What were they telling you?

14 A Some of the court records were based -- they
15 were registered to collect the funds. Some of
16 those were linked to promissory notes, which
17 were registered as mortgages against properties
18 in some cases, and the -- some of the
19 individuals that we were looking at, we knew
20 that they were connected to -- linked to
21 organized crime, and so when we saw those types
22 of private mortgages being collected essentially
23 through foreclosure type documents, that was --
24 that was also of interest. In a couple
25 instances we found that it's possible that the

1 privately lent mortgage, if it were cash, was
2 being collected through the foreclosure sale,
3 which does raise some concerns if it was cash.
4 However, it's really not BCLC's role to
5 determine these things. It was more of an
6 observation that was made in the potential
7 theory of this could be interesting if this is
8 happening.

9 Q Okay. And what reason would you have to think,
10 what reason did you have to think that some of
11 these mortgages were connected to loans made in
12 cash?

13 A In 2015 I think that's when that was first
14 discovered in the civil court records with --
15 Paul Jin was connected to some promissory notes
16 that were being collected in the civil court,
17 and finding those were interesting connecting to
18 him, and some of our research later if we were
19 looking into a PGF account opening for an
20 individual, they might be listed as the -- on
21 that court document as the borrower of said
22 funds, and so we would find that civil court
23 record tied to Paul Jin and that was a
24 promissory note, essentially, trying to get
25 payment back, and so we would flag that as

1 unusual and add that to our risk profile for
2 that player and other things.

3 Q So in 2015 at BCLC, what internal intelligence
4 did you have about Paul Jin as associated with
5 the casinos?

6 A It was my understanding when I started there I
7 think he was banned in 2012 originally for his
8 links to cash facilitation, and through times
9 that individual was linked to other cash
10 facilitation events, and so through those
11 conversations, that's sort of some of the
12 information that we had -- that I had to add to
13 the knowledge of finding these court records and
14 then connecting the dot to say this could be
15 unusual activity.

16 Q Okay. So on the one side you had internal BCLC
17 information where Mr. Jin was observed engaged
18 in cash facilitation at casinos; is that right?

19 A Yes.

20 Q And then on the other side in your open-sourced
21 research you were seeing Mr. Jin registering
22 mortgages or bringing civil actions against
23 individuals to enforce loans?

24 A It appeared that way, yes.

25 Q Okay. And in respect of the individuals who

1 were the defendants or the respondents in these
2 actions, were you able to connect them with
3 casino activity?

4 A There's a lot of people. I don't -- in some
5 cases yes; in some cases no. It all depends,
6 really.

7 Q No, I appreciate that, so maybe my question
8 should have been more precise. In at least one
9 instance were you able to connect one of these
10 named respondents or named defendants with BCLC
11 players?

12 A Yes. We were -- they would apply to open a PGF
13 account and so as part of our due diligence
14 process, we would go through all of our queries
15 and one of those queries would return, from BC
16 civil courts would return a court record and we
17 would look at that court record and if it was
18 related to a promissory note then we were
19 linking that player and their application for a
20 PGF account or and any activity they may have
21 had in the casino. So in those cases yes, we
22 would be linking that activity to the player.

23 Q Okay. And can you say whether any of the
24 individuals noted in these -- in this -- in
25 court actions, either as respondents or as

1 defendants, to your recollection were any of
2 them ever connected to cash facilitation
3 incidents at casinos?

4 A No. There was no way for me to connect these
5 civil court records to -- directly to activity
6 in the casino. It was -- no.

7 Q No. And, sorry, let me reframe the question. I
8 think I wasn't stuffily precise. I'm not asking
9 whether you were able to connect the subject
10 matter of a civil court action to a casino
11 transaction. My question is simply were you
12 ever able to identify a respondent or a defendant
13 in one of those court actions as a person who
14 had been involved in a cash facilitation event
15 at a casino?

16 A Off the top of my head, no, I couldn't answer
17 that question. I would have to conduct some
18 research on that one. It's like --

19 Q I'm sorry. I interrupted you. Please finish
20 your answer.

21 A That was my answer.

22 Q Okay. So is it simply that that's not a -- you
23 don't -- is that research that you did at the
24 time?

25 A That would have been something that the

1 investigations side, the AML investigations side
2 would have looked into based off of the
3 intelligence report that we gave back to them.
4 That's the sort of thing that they would be
5 looking into to, you know, if it was identified
6 that this individual was linked to a promissory
7 note or private mortgage then the intelligence
8 report, the AML investigations team, they would
9 then be making that assessment as to the risk
10 assessment for that player and if they were
11 connected to it. So it's a better question for
12 Mr. Tottenham.

13 Q So am I -- do I understand correctly that your
14 work and your research was more concerned with
15 what you were able to discover about people in
16 open-source research outside of the casinos?
17 You were looking outside. Somebody else's job
18 was to look at what was happening inside the
19 casinos, in other words?

20 A Yes. We looked somewhat into the player
21 activity just to get some context as to who we
22 were conducting the research on. But when it
23 comes to the risk assessment of the findings in
24 totality, that's the AML investigations unit's
25 role in this.

1 Q And I think it would be helpful if we --
2 actually, before I go to the document, I wanted
3 to look at some of your documents that you
4 referred to previously just to show how you
5 were -- visually they help us understand what
6 you were doing, but first you mentioned
7 promissory notes, and I just -- I wanted to ask
8 you what the context was for your comment about
9 promissory notes relating to private mortgages.
10 If you could give us a little bit more detail.

11 A The lender of the funds would claim to have a
12 promissory note for an amount of money that
13 was -- funds that were lent to an individual.
14 That contract could have been related to a
15 mortgage that was registered against a property
16 or it could have just been a private loan aside
17 from mortgage documents that was -- a private
18 contract that was being represented in the civil
19 case. It varied.

20 Q All right. So the references to promissory
21 notes that's something that came out the civil
22 filings; is that correct?

23 A Correct.

24 Q Okay. Thank you. That was what I wanted to
25 make sure I was clear on.

1 Madam Registrar, I'm going to ask you to
2 pull up some documents, and this is for
3 internal -- this is not to be displayed on the
4 live stream, the next set of documents. If you
5 could please pull up BCLC0015280.

6 Mr. Rudnicki, do you recognize this
7 document?

8 A Yes.

9 Q Did you author it?

10 A I did.

11 Q And can you just briefly describe for the
12 Commissioner what this document is and what its
13 purpose was and who its intended audience was.

14 A This document was prepared when the government
15 commissioned some reports to be written in
16 regards to the real estate industry, and I
17 thought that that was a really good step, and I
18 reached out to -- I did some open-source
19 research and got some contact information for
20 Maureen Maloney, I believe, and reached out to
21 her and gave her a bit of a background of what I
22 do and some of the observations that I've been
23 making as it does relate to real estate. I
24 thought I had a fairly unique perspective
25 considering the amount of research that we were

1 doing on a regular basis into a lot of these
2 players and finding things as it relates to real
3 estate, and with my background and training with
4 AML that sort of led me to derive some more
5 thoughts about the industry and potential ideas
6 that may be useful to other people. So I
7 reached out to her, and this document was made
8 for a meeting that eventually was scheduled.
9 Dan Perrin was sent. He was also writing a
10 report I think more from a regulatory
11 perspective in regards to real estate, and so
12 this document was created to facilitate a
13 meeting that Rob Kroeker and myself set up with
14 Dan Perrin.

15 MS. PATEL: Okay. And before I forget,
16 Mr. Commissioner, if we could mark this as the
17 next exhibit. I think we're at 670?

18 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. Mr. Commissioner, you're muted.

19 THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry, my question was had we
20 marked Mr. Rudnicki's CV?

21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, we have.

22 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. So this one will be
23 670. Thank you.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, exhibit 670.

25 **EXHIBIT 670: Real Estate Observations BCLC AML**

1 **Unit 2019**

2 MS. PATEL:

3 Q And I think this is -- in this document, as you
4 state in the title, you recorded some real
5 estate observations that you were making. Is
6 that right?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Okay. And so we're going to scroll forward.

9 Madam Registrar, if we could go to the next
10 page, please.

11 Here I see -- I understand that the purpose
12 here was to talk about the kinds of information
13 sources you had available. Is that right?

14 A Yes. This was to give them -- him an overview
15 of the process that we go through and the
16 research that we're conducting on our players
17 and to give him some background, which is
18 basically stuff we covered recently, so our RCMP
19 information-sharing agreement and then our
20 access to BC OnLine land titles, the corporate
21 registry and then our access to Canadian
22 international court records, companies and our
23 adverse media watch lists type information. So
24 just to give a broad overview of the research
25 and the sources where we're conducting our

1 research from.

2 MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, the next page, please.

3 Q All right. So Mr. Rudnicki, can you start by
4 telling us what a link chart is?

5 A A link chart is an intelligent tool to link
6 icons and show relationships between entities.
7 That could be people, documents, buildings,
8 cars, telephones, et cetera. It's an
9 association chart of relationships, essentially.

10 Q And what software do you use to create these
11 link charts?

12 A We use IBM's i2 Analyst Notebook, which is an
13 industry standard in law enforcement,
14 essentially.

15 Q Okay. I understand what we're looking at here,
16 of course, is a PowerPoint presentation that you
17 put together. Is this one link chart that we're
18 looking at on this page?

19 A No, it's a collage of four link charts with
20 examples of some observations in relation to a
21 variety of things.

22 MS. PATEL: Okay. Madam Registrar, I'm going to ask,
23 if we can, if we can zoom into the link chart to
24 the number 1 on the left-hand side. I think
25 that's a good level of zoom. And if we could --

1 if you could pull the screen over so we can see.
2 So number 1. I just want to walk you through,
3 Mr. Rudnicki, some of the observations that you
4 were making and the reasons that you excerpted
5 these particular parts of link charts for this
6 presentation. So we can't see it now, but on
7 the right-hand side you have a number 1 that
8 says "lawyer registering mortgage for alleged
9 organized crime figure." What was the purpose
10 of highlighting this link chart for the -- for
11 Mr. Perrin and the expert panel? What was it
12 showing?

13 A Here I correctly identified the lawyer
14 registering a private mortgage from an organized
15 crime member, and that -- that spurred from the
16 person at the top there. It was a management
17 request to conduct an EDD, an enhanced due
18 diligence review, I believe, on that person
19 based off of some of their unusual activity in
20 the casino, and so we did some research to
21 assess risk on this particular player, and that
22 led to their name being on a land title
23 connected to an address, and that address had, I
24 think, three mortgages attached to it, one of
25 which was a private mortgage, and the name I

1 recognized as someone linked to organized crime.
2 So I purchased that mortgage and confirmed
3 through address information that we had in our
4 database to the mortgage document as being the
5 same person. And I thought that was important
6 to highlight because it could be unusual that
7 this type of activity is happening, that private
8 mortgages are being loaned from people linked to
9 organized crime. And also in conjunction with
10 that is the fact that a lawyer was registering
11 this mortgage, and the lawyer in this case at
12 the time had an investigation ongoing, and so
13 there was some adverse media and concerns around
14 that, and it raised the question of perhaps this
15 lawyer is being utilized for their ability to
16 register mortgages, private mortgages.

17 Q And, again, this isn't -- the link chart doesn't
18 indicate that you have discovered any evidence
19 of wrongdoing per se; is that right? It's just
20 observations that you're making linking
21 transactions and individuals?

22 A Correct. It's observations. It doesn't prove
23 anything. Further investigation would be
24 required in order to determine if this was
25 anything untowards as far as BCLC's role in

1 this. It's to -- this is about as far as we
2 would take this sort of observation in our case.
3 We'd assess it for what it is.

4 Q I want to ask this: on the charts that we're
5 going to be looking at, there are a number of
6 individuals such as the person on example
7 number 1 who appear in a red circle. Can you
8 just tell us what that red circle indicates?

9 A Generally I use the red circle to highlight
10 individuals that are banned in our casinos for
11 public safety reasons or AML concerns.

12 Q Okay. So in this case Mr. Kwok Chung Tam had
13 been banned by BCLC, it says here, for five
14 years, and you indicate on your chart that you
15 discovered that he'd made a third mortgage of
16 \$200,000 to this individual who was the
17 individual on whom you were performing this
18 enhanced due diligence. Is that right?

19 A Correct.

20 MS. PATEL: And then, Madam Registrar, if we can just
21 scroll down the page, if we can look at
22 scenario 2. And can you -- on the right-hand
23 side again -- you can't see it because we're
24 over on the left side of the document. Number 2
25 you indicate:

1 "The lawyer is owner through power of
2 attorney for 1 of 2 properties linked to a
3 beneficial owner."

4 Can you just explain why you highlighted this
5 example for Mr. Perrin and the expert panel.

6 A Right. So in reviewing the evidence and in
7 preparing this document, it came to my attention
8 that I mislabelled this individual as a lawyer.
9 They were power of attorney. And on the -- I
10 believe on one of the -- another document, this
11 occurrence happened as well, and I just read at
12 the bottom of the document "borrower" and the
13 attorney, and that sentence to me, I interpreted
14 it as lawyer, which was incorrect. So I
15 mislabelled this individual on this. It was
16 related to a power of attorney.

17 Q I see. I see. Okay. So that individual who
18 has the barrister's wig on at the bottom is in
19 fact a person who had a power of attorney for
20 the beneficial owner of a property?

21 A Correct. In the beginning of why we were
22 looking into this was the individual who
23 presented the bank draft to us had a different
24 address on the bank draft than we had on file
25 for that person, and that raised some concerns

1 for us, and so we looked into maybe this
2 individual owns that place as well, and through
3 that exercise it was discovered that the second
4 property that this player was connected to was
5 held by a power of attorney. So from a risk
6 perspective it was good for us to connect this
7 individual to that bank draft, which we
8 ultimately did process, and that was -- that
9 was -- everything checked out there.

10 MS. PATEL: Okay. Madam Registrar, if we could move
11 up to the right a bit to scenario 3.

12 Q And this was labelled in the right-hand side
13 as -- that's fine -- as "lawyer linked to
14 property with eight residents, owner linked to
15 individual connected to organize crime figures."
16 If you could just tell us what the observations
17 were that you were making in scenario 3 here.

18 A This property was of interest to us due to the
19 seven or eight people that were connected to it.
20 We thought that was unusual that so many people
21 would be connected to the same property. And
22 then upon reviewing their occupations, there was
23 a lot of medical or hospital type relations
24 to -- back to China. And we tried to determine
25 what the nature of these associations were, and

1 the owner of the property, once we determined
2 who that was, we started to explore who they
3 were in our database, and through one of their
4 associates in our database, that individual
5 linked out to a couple connections to people who
6 were receiving -- being connected to people that
7 are in organized crime. And in particular the
8 same individual that we talked about in chart 1
9 is mentioned on chart 3 as providing another
10 mortgage to another individual for a different
11 amount. And that was -- that was interesting.
12 And so we also started to pay some attention to
13 lawyers that were registering mortgages as part
14 of our link charts because there's the potential
15 that something could be happening there, so we
16 just wanted to collect as much information as
17 possible and put it on a chart.

18 MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, if you could just scroll
19 up a little bit so we can see the top. That's
20 good. Thank you.

21 Q The top of the diagram 3 you have the owner of
22 this property which is connected to eight
23 individuals being connected, and simply it looks
24 by association to three people who are appearing
25 in red circles, Mr. Jin, Mr. Tam and Mr. Qin,

1 all of whom I assume were barred by BCLC for
2 various reasons.

3 A Yes.

4 MS. PATEL: Okay. Madam Registrar, if we can zoom
5 out and at page-- if we could go down to page 4
6 of this presentation. Thank you.

7 Q Your list of examples continues on page 4,
8 Mr. Rudnicki. Now, if we can zoom into incident
9 number or example number 5 here. This is -- and
10 on the right-hand side the description -- the
11 description is "mortgage lenders linked to
12 organized crime." Can you tell us what you were
13 observing in this link chart.

14 A The person that we were looking into here I
15 believe once we started connecting out -- again,
16 I can't see the whole link chart, but the
17 example here is that we connected the individual
18 as the borrower of privately lent funds, and one
19 of those individuals is connected to a court
20 record where they are listed alongside of
21 Mr. Jin, and so a private lender providing cash,
22 potentially it was cash, to this player in our
23 casino was of concern because if Mr. Jin is
24 listed on the same court record in the same
25 fashion that this person is connected to another

1 court record and they're involved in these other
2 loans separate from that court record, it raised
3 some concerns the relationship there and that's
4 really all that observation is.

5 Q And I think you mentioned that it's difficult --
6 you can't see the whole record here.

7 Madam Registrar, if we could take down this
8 document and if you could bring up -- and again,
9 not on the live stream -- document BCLC0016937.
10 Thank you.

11 And, Mr. Rudnicki, does this look like the
12 full link chart that you'd excerpted in that --
13 on that page of that PowerPoint presentation?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Okay. And so we can -- you see at the top
16 Mr. Jin you mentioned associated by way of a
17 court filing there with another individual who's
18 not -- not in a red circle, so I assume that
19 person, Mr. Li, was not subject to BCLC barring?

20 A No, there's no evidence that they were in our
21 database. That's one person on this chart
22 that's providing -- it looks like two loans to
23 the one individual, the red enlarged female
24 there at the bottom left, and then that same
25 individual is connected to if you go to the

1 right there's a land title that's marked there
2 with another individual with a red circle around
3 them, and they're a public safety barring.

4 Q Okay.

5 A They're listed as the mortgager on that land
6 title along with the other individual, Mr. Li
7 there at the top. So this one land title had
8 two -- looks like two private mortgages
9 connected to it. That's what -- sort of what we
10 saw with this, and it's in the amounts of -- you
11 know, the smaller loans are \$20,000, \$60,000,
12 and then the one mortgage is 500,000 connected
13 to a person we banned and then the other
14 mortgage at the top right there who's not
15 banned, they're also providing a mortgage. And
16 I have to go review the exact mortgage
17 documents, but these links were -- would have
18 been based off of those.

19 Q But would multiple private mortgages like this
20 cause you concern?

21 A It's an indicator for -- with our understanding
22 of how the underground economy could be
23 operating and lending cash to people through
24 these mechanisms in securing these types of
25 loans through private mortgages, how these

1 mortgages or these loans are paid back is --
2 could be a variety of things. It could be
3 overseas, it could be in town. It's very
4 similar to, I guess, the model, if you will,
5 that was -- we were seeing with some of the
6 players. They were borrowing funds and coming
7 to the casino and this, I would say, is very
8 similar. They're not coming to the casino;
9 they're instead potentially using it to renovate
10 their house or purchase a house.

11 MS. PATEL: Mr. Commissioner, if we could mark this
12 document as the next exhibit. I think we're at
13 671 now.

14 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Very well. 671.

15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 671.

16 **EXHIBIT 671: Link Chart prepared by Brad**
17 **Rudnicki - November 27, 2018**

18 MS. PATEL: And, Madam Registrar, we can take that
19 down. And I won't go back to it. I don't ...
20 and, Mr. Commissioner, can I also at this time
21 seek a direction that neither exhibit 670 nor
22 671 will be posted on the website until such
23 time as they are appropriately redacted?

24 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I'll make that direction.

25 MS. PATEL: Thank you.

1 Q So, Mr. Rudnicki, I don't think I need to take
2 you back to the presentation you were giving,
3 but I understand from the balance of the
4 PowerPoint that you also presented some ideas to
5 the expert panel and to Mr. Perrin about your
6 thoughts on the need for a real estate
7 intelligence unit. Is that right?

8 A Yes.

9 Q Can you just describe why you -- what led you to
10 believe that a real estate intelligence unit at
11 the provincial level was something that's
12 necessary?

13 A Part of that was discussed with Mr. Kroeker, and
14 he thought that the ideas in that document
15 were -- had some merit, and the rationale that I
16 came to was that there's the opportunity to
17 conduct due diligence on a lot of these types of
18 transactions, and I drew parallels to the work
19 that we were doing in the casino industry and
20 know your customer type techniques for opening a
21 PGF account per se. So part of that was, you
22 know, perhaps there could be a process like that
23 for private lenders and looking at adverse media
24 related to these private lenders. In many cases
25 the timing of these private mortgages, if those

1 searches were conducted, that would be -- could
2 be flagged as a higher risk transaction based
3 off of adverse media that's available for the
4 individuals that are conducting those
5 transactions and perhaps more scrutiny could be
6 applied to those types of transactions and/or
7 the lawyers that are helping conduct those
8 transactions similar to what we do with casinos
9 in our risk assessment for who are the players
10 that we are transacting with and what types of
11 information we can find and add to our risk
12 assessment as part of our risk-based approach
13 for players that are engaging with us.

14 Q I think you said that you thought -- I think you
15 said Mr. Kroeker thought that this was valuable.
16 What led you to believe that he thought that?

17 A We had a discussion about it, and he said Brad,
18 that's a good idea.

19 Q Okay.

20 A He was very supportive of this sort of side
21 quest, if you will, as it really didn't have
22 anything to do with the roles and
23 responsibilities that BCLC had to conduct. He
24 supported it, though, because he thought there
25 was some value in that based off of these

1 observations.

2 Q And you mentioned a couple of times that, you
3 know, it's not BCLC's mandate or it's not
4 BCLC's -- it's not within your scope to pursue
5 certain issues. Besides this presentation that
6 you made to the expert panel, and to Mr. Perrin,
7 were there other steps that you were taking with
8 this information to bring it to the attention of
9 those perhaps who did have a mandate to pursue
10 it? And I just -- I know you're there with your
11 counsel, and I just want to make sure you have
12 an opportunity to pay attention if they're
13 signalling anything to you. Okay.

14 A We did share this information with the RCMP,
15 which was part of our information-sharing
16 agreement. So some of these things were topical
17 in some of our meetings and we'd bring these
18 items to those joint meetings that we were
19 having. And through that the conversation was
20 that this could be interesting for perhaps CRA,
21 this could be interesting for the health
22 authority, this could be interesting for CBSA,
23 et cetera, and so we kind of relied on that
24 conduit of information for them to perhaps look
25 into it further if required.

1 Q Okay. And in a couple of those examples that we
2 looked at, and one of them, I appreciate, was a
3 mistake of identification of a lawyer, but in
4 other instances I believe you indicated that you
5 noted the involvement of lawyers in
6 transactions; is that fair?

7 A Yes.

8 Q And the involvement that you were observing, did
9 that cause you concern in any way?

10 A They were just observations. More work would
11 have to be done in order to confirm if something
12 unusual is happening there. So ...

13 Q Was it your observation that you were seeing the
14 same law firms or the same lawyers involved in
15 transactions with -- in particular with these
16 private mortgages?

17 A Yes, there was some patterns with people that we
18 know or linked to organized crime and the
19 lawyers in which they were using, and that could
20 be unusual. It could be not. But there were
21 observed connections on that level, yes.

22 Q And did you or BCLC ever take steps to reach out
23 to the Law Society with respect to those
24 observations?

25 A I did not.

1 Q Are you aware if anybody else at BCLC did?

2 A No.

3 Q I would like, actually, to go back to
4 BCLC0015280, exhibit 669, Madam Registrar. And
5 to the 13th page of that document.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Just to clarify, this is exhibit 670.

7 MS. PATEL: Thank you. Yes.

8 Q Can you, Mr. Rudnicki -- this document is a
9 little bit, this page of the presentation is a
10 little bit different than what -- than the other
11 link charts we were just looking at in that
12 there aren't actual -- there aren't names of
13 individuals, of real individuals associated with
14 these figures. Can you explain what it is that
15 you -- first of all, does this link chart derive
16 from actual observed facts?

17 A No. I wouldn't call them -- I would say
18 observes. There's another document that shows
19 transition of renovation of a couple places that
20 could fit this model. Whether that's happening
21 or not is unknown. It's merely an idea or a
22 theory of potentially what could be happening.
23 And this arrangement was more or less created --
24 you could almost replace the house costs, the
25 house there, with casino. It's an individual

1 borrows some funds and uses those funds to pay
2 contractors to build a house. It's the same
3 pattern that an individual borrows funds and
4 comes to the casino and uses those funds. Is
5 there anything untowards about the source of the
6 cash, that's unknown. To me in this example I
7 did write proceeds of crime, and it's the
8 borrower of a house could renovate their
9 property very easily and pay cash to the
10 contractors and put -- add that value to the
11 house. And then in this example I included a
12 foreign country as to where those funds are
13 repaid. Again, it could just stay in Canada if
14 that house was sold and the funds were recouped
15 through the sale of the house then those funds
16 could be transferred within Canada and paid to
17 the original lender. That's what this chart's
18 really trying to illustrate.

19 Q And is this chart more than a hypothetical, or
20 is it based on observations that you were making
21 as part of your open-source research?

22 A I would say it was a hypothetical that led to
23 finding observations using Google Street View
24 and timelines in relation to the purchase and
25 sale of a house in relation to those people and

1 their connections to the underground economy
2 that we made, and so it's sort of -- this fit
3 that model, if you will. Is that exactly what's
4 happening? I don't know. It's not really me to
5 figure it out. But it was just being curious
6 about the whole topic at hand and how this could
7 be happening. I thought it was important to
8 sort of highlight this example and we did
9 find it -- or I did find it in a couple research
10 items on a player and found their house and then
11 look at it over time and the house would be
12 renovated and then sold. And in some cases
13 millions of dollars in profit were made in a
14 couple days and that example is in one of the
15 other documents that I provided to you.

16 Q And would this be with players -- would these
17 instances involve players with private
18 mortgages, with persons that were suspected of
19 connections to organized crime?

20 A Yes. Some of those individuals were connected
21 to unusual activity at the casinos with cash
22 facilitators, which brought up the idea of maybe
23 this is what is happening in this case and maybe
24 it's not. It's just an observation that I made.

25 MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, we can take down this

1 document.

2 Q And the last document I'm going to take you to,
3 Mr. Rudnicki, is -- Madam Registrar, the
4 document B Rudnicki "Analytical Concepts for
5 Cullen Commission." Mr. Rudnicki, do you
6 recognize this document?

7 A Yes.

8 Q And can you just describe how it came about and
9 what its purpose is.

10 A This document was developed over the years, I
11 would say, in finding certain examples in the
12 database and the databases and creating links.
13 It was more for my own interest and potentially
14 to share with other individuals that may have
15 the interest to conduct this type of analysis.
16 It's not a BCLC-related product in the sense of
17 I created it out of my own interest or sharing
18 with others. I have had conversations with
19 people in the mortgage industry, CRA, CBSA, et
20 cetera, and this was one of those documents that
21 I thought it would be good to collect these
22 ideas. In my research I would come across a
23 pattern in the data and think this observation
24 could actually be replicated and other people or
25 other entities or other similar linkages could

1 be found through analytical methods, and so I
2 would create a record of that idea and put it
3 into this document and sort of slowly built it
4 over time with the intent of maybe one day some
5 of these things would happen and this type of
6 analysis could occur if someone were given a
7 mandate or had the interest to look into things
8 further. I thought these would be useful.

9 Q So kind of a diary of AML ideas that came
10 together into one document?

11 A Yeah. And it's -- again, it's an ideas
12 document. There's definitely more discussion
13 that could happen on some of these ideas and
14 they could be refined further. They could be
15 moot points at this point in time. Like one of
16 the items on there was probably added to the
17 document in 2015 or '16, and but now I know that
18 that's something that is occurring, so maybe a
19 seed I planted grew. But there's other ideas in
20 this document, sort of my own personal thoughts
21 as to if I had access to all the data and it was
22 my job to look further into things, these are
23 some of the ideas that I thought would be
24 interesting to explore.

25 MS. PATEL: And, Mr. Commissioner, I note

1 Mr. Rudnicki commented this is his own document;
2 it's not a BCLC document, and so it's not
3 labelled that way. Could we have this marked as
4 the next exhibit. I think we're at 672.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Very well. 672.

6 THE REGISTRAR: 672.

7 **EXHIBIT 672: Analytical Concepts for Cullen**
8 **Commission**

9 MS. PATEL:

10 Q And I want to -- Mr. Rudnicki, if there's
11 anything in particular in this document that you
12 wanted to draw our attention to, please let me
13 know, but I wanted to take you to page 13 of 16.
14 And just to highlight here that you've given
15 quite a bit of thought to different regulators
16 and data holders in BC. Is that a fair
17 assessment of what you've done here?

18 A Yes.

19 Q All right. And much as you suggested in your
20 presentation to the expert panel and to
21 Mr. Perrin, I see you're suggesting a provincial
22 unit or a task force?

23 A Yes. Again, I'm no expert in how these sort of
24 structures would be created and stuff. It was
25 just my idea of what ideally could potentially

1 occur because there is a lot of overlap that
2 occurs in this realm, I would say, and there's
3 many instances where it would be useful to have
4 information sharing amongst these groups in an
5 official form to connect the dots because
6 when -- and build understanding in all of the
7 types of different industries that are being
8 overseen here. And I think that would be a
9 beneficial approach to tackling things like
10 money laundering because it's not specific to
11 one industry. It traverses many industries, and
12 the enforcement is the other angle to it all and
13 how that relates to observations that are made
14 in real estate. It could relate to CRA, it
15 could relate to a police matter, it could relate
16 to civil forfeiture, which would be linked to
17 the police, and these discoveries that are made
18 through the research that even BCLC does could
19 provide valuable information and observations to
20 say, we found something; this looks interesting;
21 could someone run with it and determine if
22 something unusual is happening. I think this
23 unit could conduct a lot of other things in
24 regards to due diligence and intelligence
25 analysis on the transactions and the data that's

1 available. And there's a lot of data that I
2 think is available -- potentially available for
3 research and identifying things that would
4 require further followup. And really it kind
5 of -- it parallels on some of the stuff that we
6 do at BCLC in the sense of know your customer
7 and monitoring transactions and in that regard
8 in conducting due diligence essentially in the
9 casino we have hundreds of cameras and trained
10 people who are observing transactions and
11 reporting these transactions, and these reports
12 are getting sent to FINTRAC, the police and GPEB
13 from our perspective. However, for like private
14 mortgages, for example, it's -- what is the --
15 and perhaps I lack the understanding of what all
16 the processes are as far as know your customer
17 and due diligence, but I see value if there was
18 a unit to conduct research on these types of
19 transactions which aren't happening under the
20 hundreds of cameras and involving multiple
21 people and trained individuals to monitor these
22 transactions. And I would assume that there's a
23 lot of private mortgages that are being
24 registered and some scrutiny could be applied to
25 it with some tenacity if there was a provincial

1 unit like this. For one example. There's I
2 think 16 in this document that sort of tie into
3 ideas like that.

4 Q All right. Mr. Commissioner, just to note, I
5 don't believe -- I'll let Mr. Stephens
6 or Ms. Roos jump in if I'm incorrect, but I
7 don't believe that there's any reason that this
8 document can't be published or posted to the
9 website unredacted as an exhibit.

10 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. If there is no
11 objection, then I will make --

12 MS. PATEL: Mr. Commissioner, I'm getting a note from
13 IT that we are -- there's a problem with the
14 live stream. I think we need to stand down for
15 a few minutes.

16 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. We'll do that. Thank
17 you.

18 IT SUPPORT: Actually, apologies, Mr. Commissioner,
19 if anybody is watching the live stream, it would
20 be on the second browser. Thank you, everyone.
21 So we can continue.

22 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you.

23 MS. PATEL: All right. I take it back. Nonetheless,
24 Mr. Commissioner, I have no more questions for
25 this witness.

1 THE REGISTRAR: Sorry, Mr. Commissioner, do you want
2 to mark that last document as an exhibit?

3 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Thank you.

4 THE REGISTRAR: That will be exhibit 673.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

6 **EXHIBIT 673: Incident Report #IN20150017386 -**
7 **April 2, 2015**

8 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Ms. Herbst on behalf
9 of the highway society of British Columbia, who
10 has been allocated 10 minutes.

11 MS. HERBST: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

12 **EXAMINATION BY MS. HERBST:**

13 Q I very much appreciate, if I may just say,
14 Mr. Rudnicki's correction at the outset in
15 direct of a couple of mislabellings of people
16 who aren't lawyers as lawyers because, to
17 everyone's relief, I'm sure that will save me
18 the need to go through the lawyers directory and
19 various land title documents I provided last
20 week. I also note that I very much appreciate
21 Ms. Patel and Mr. Rudnicki's joint clarification
22 of the limitations on BCLC's mandate and
23 observations, so that should save a bit of time.

24 So, Mr. Rudnicki, as you've gathered, I'm
25 counsel for the Law Society of BC. My name is

1 Ludmila Herbst, and I just have a few points to
2 touch on. The first of them is I believe you
3 drew a distinction between your role and the AML
4 investigations team --

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry, I'm just going to interrupt
6 for one second, Ms. Herbst. I'm not going to
7 stop you, but I realize I left over Ms. Chewka
8 for the province. I just want to indicate that
9 I will get back to her. But I think we've
10 launched with you, so let's just carry on.

11 MS. HERBST: All right. Thank you very much,
12 Mr. Commissioner.

13 Q Mr. Rudnicki, I believe you drew a distinction
14 between your role and the AML investigations
15 team, and I just wanted to clarify. Your role
16 doesn't involve, for example, doing interviews
17 with particular people. You're more analysis of
18 the documents that you gather through
19 open-source materials and so on?

20 A Correct. I do not do interviews.

21 Q Okay. Now, just in terms of your background, I
22 just have a few more questions for
23 clarification, and if I ask about an element of
24 experience or expertise or a degree that you
25 don't have, I in no way mean that in a

1 disparaging way. It's just to clarify my
2 understanding. I will say that there are many
3 things that I would be answering no to as well,
4 including software expertise, so I just qualify
5 that.

6 But, Mr. Rudnicki, you haven't trained as a
7 real estate agent?

8 A No.

9 Q And you've not worked as a realtor in practical
10 terms?

11 A No.

12 Q You've not worked as a mortgage broker?

13 A I have not.

14 Q And you haven't worked in the banking sector?

15 A No. I have not.

16 Q And you don't have training in accounting?

17 A No, I do not.

18 Q And, again, I say this with particular --
19 there's absolutely no reason you should have,
20 but you don't have a law degree?

21 A I do not.

22 Q Okay. And you're also not a notary?

23 A No.

24 Q Okay. And then my last question you mentioned
25 speaking with Ms. Patel about software, the IBM

1 standard that you work with. Have you ever
2 worked with a product by a developer named
3 Quantexa?

4 A No, I haven't heard of that.

5 MS. HERBST: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Rudnicki. Those
6 are my questions. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

7 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Herbst. And
8 Ms. Chewka, I'm sorry for leaping over you, but
9 I will come back to you now. On behalf of the
10 province you've been allocated 15 minutes.

11 MS. CHEWKA: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

12 **EXAMINATION BY MS. CHEWKA:**

13 Q Mr. Rudnicki, can you hear me okay?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Thank you. Mr. Rudnicki, I understand from your
16 CV that you have a bachelors degree of
17 technology, crime and intelligence analysis from
18 BCIT. Is that correct?

19 A Yes.

20 Q And your résumé indicates that you focused on
21 various analytical skills while at BCIT, the
22 criminal law procedure, legal evidence and major
23 case management; is that correct?

24 A Yes.

25 Q And while completing your degree, I just wanted

1 to confirm that you didn't take courses relating
2 to, for example, the regulation of the real
3 estate sector?

4 A No, I did not.

5 Q Or the regulation of mortgage brokers, for
6 example?

7 A No.

8 Q Or the regulation of the legal profession?

9 A No.

10 Q I note as well in your CV that you've received a
11 diploma of technology of petroleum and natural
12 gas from BCIT as well; is that correct?

13 A Correct.

14 Q And is it fair to say when completing this
15 diploma again you didn't take courses with
16 respect to the regulation of BC's real estate
17 sector?

18 A Correct.

19 Q Or mortgage broker regulation?

20 A Correct.

21 Q Or the regulation of the legal profession?

22 A And yes, correct.

23 Q And, Mr. Rudnicki, you're currently an employee
24 of BCLC; is that correct?

25 A Yes.

1 Q And you're employed with the AML unit legal
2 compliance and security?

3 A I am, yes.

4 Q And you currently hold the position of AML
5 Intelligence Specialist; is that right?

6 A Yes.

7 Q In your witness statement you indicated that
8 you're responsible for conducting background
9 research on casino patrons, in particular for
10 know your customer, know your client purposes;
11 is that correct?

12 A Correct.

13 Q And you helped develop customer due diligence
14 policies?

15 A Yes, I did.

16 Q And in your current role you also ensure that
17 BCLC remains compliant with the regulatory
18 framework that applies to the BCLC?

19 A Yes, that's part of my role.

20 Q In your capacity at BCLC you're not responsible,
21 for example, the regulation of the real estate
22 sector?

23 A No.

24 Q Or the regulation of mortgage brokers?

25 A No.

1 Q Or the regulation of the legal profession?

2 A No.

3 Q But in your capacity at BCLC you made
4 observations about real estate transactions
5 involving persons that BCLC knew or believed to
6 be were involved in cash facilitation at
7 casinos; is that correct?

8 A Correct.

9 Q And those observations that you made were based
10 on accessing open-source information?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Now, I understand that -- I'm not sure it was
13 actually marked as an exhibit twice, but it's
14 exhibit number 672 or 673 or both perhaps. But
15 it's the report about the analytical concepts.
16 You said you had created that document separate
17 and apart from your role at BCLC; is that
18 correct?

19 A Yes.

20 Q And so you didn't make that document in the
21 regular course of your employment duties?

22 A I would have worked on it during work hours.

23 Q But you wouldn't have been required to do that
24 for your role as an AML intelligence specialist?

25 A No, it's not part of my role to do that.

1 Q It was created out of interest, I believe you
2 had testified today.

3 A Yes.

4 Q And I believe you agreed with commission counsel
5 who described it as a diary of AML ideas?

6 A Correct.

7 Q And you testified that admittedly this is a
8 document that's been a working document, and so
9 some of the ideas included in it might be out of
10 date now?

11 A Yes.

12 Q And when you also testified that when you were
13 creating this document that you didn't have
14 access necessarily to all of the data that you
15 would have wanted?

16 A In the fashion of being able to access it from a
17 database administration perspective, no. The
18 data that we have access to is through the front
19 pay wall, and so we have to buy singular pieces
20 of information, which isn't the best way to do
21 analysis. It's better to look at an entire data
22 set and run queries to derive meaning and
23 prioritize things in that nature.

24 Q And in this document as well, I would say -- or
25 maybe you can correct me if I'm wrong, but it

1 appears that the document contains
2 recommendations or musings about what could be
3 done, for example, to address some of the money
4 laundering concerns that you've identified in
5 the real estate sector. Is that a fair
6 assessment?

7 A Yes. It's an ideas document and it's further
8 discussion would be required to validate some of
9 those ideas and build upon them. It's by no
10 means the -- it's not a finalized document, if
11 you will. So it would require further research
12 to determine strategies that may be useful or
13 may not be useful in order to assess risk in
14 those types of environments.

15 Q For example, if you have a copy or I can ask
16 Madam Registrar to pull it up on the screen, but
17 it's page 11 of the document. You have an idea
18 of holding realtors accountable, for example?

19 A Right.

20 Q Do you recall that section?

21 A Yes.

22 Q You make some suggestions about how you can
23 regulate and hold realtors accountable here,
24 just, again, ideas about what could be done.
25 Would you agree with that?

1 A Yeah, this one stemmed from a freedom of
2 information request that we got from FINTRAC
3 back in 2010 to 2013, I believe was the time
4 frame, and it was quantifying the number of LCTs
5 and STRs that were being filed by industry in BC
6 and -- or across Canada, and we were interested
7 in sort of where the casinos fit into the
8 overall volume of where these types of
9 transactions or reports that are going to
10 FINTRAC were coming from, and in particular one
11 thing that stood out for me was the lack of STRs
12 that were being filed out of the real estate
13 industry, and the number was -- while BCLC was
14 around thousands of transactions and the banks
15 were in the tens of thousands of transactions
16 the real estate industry had minimal -- less
17 than 20 in some cases in an entire year. And to
18 me I thought that was unusual given some of the
19 observations that were being made, and I would
20 just expect that some of those transactions were
21 being reported and through other personal
22 conversations that I had with some realtors --
23 and this isn't saying anything about all
24 realtors; it's just my personal experience was I
25 heard things like oh, I wouldn't file an STR

1 because it would jeopardize my sale. And
2 through collecting information from a variety of
3 sources that sort of helped me develop this idea
4 of are there realtors that are not flagging
5 transactions that should be flagged and reported
6 to FINTRAC. And that's sort of the idea around
7 this. It would be easy to -- the idea that
8 section would -- if you were engaging in a
9 contract and selling real estate to somebody and
10 it's easy to Google that person's name and you
11 can see a photo of that person, it's the same
12 person that you're meeting and they're
13 conducting a transaction and perhaps there's
14 some indicators that are relevant to AML
15 training, that could lead to submitting an STR
16 and it's an idea of what could be done.

17 Q And Ms. Patel took you to page 13 of the
18 document, which was your suggestion about the
19 creation of a provincial task force?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Do you recall that --

22 THE REGISTRAR: Sorry, Ms. Chewka, do you want me to
23 bring this up on the screen?

24 MS. CHEWKA: No, I don't think it's necessary. I
25 don't intend to go through it in detail. But

1 thank you, Madam Registrar.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Also, sorry to interrupt, I just want
3 to clarify, we have this document marked twice.
4 So it should be 672. Thank you.

5 MS. CHEWKA: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

6 Q When you were discussing this page or this
7 provincial task force that was one of your ideas
8 with Ms. Patel, you had testified that you're no
9 expert with respect to these issues. Would you
10 agree with that still?

11 A Yes.

12 Q And on this document there is a number of
13 stakeholders listed, and that's also listed at
14 page 14 of the document. For example, in your
15 proposed task force it may affect the following
16 stakeholders as you've identified them as. The
17 Land Title and Survey Authority. Would you
18 agree with that?

19 A Yes.

20 Q The BC Law Society?

21 A Yes.

22 Q The Superintendent of Real Estate?

23 A Yes.

24 Q You also reference FICOM in your report, which
25 is of course since been changed a BCFSA, and so

1 FICOM is listed here, but would you agree that
2 also BCFSA as its successor would also be
3 affected by this proposed task force?

4 A Yes.

5 Q And BCFSA is responsible for the regulation of
6 mortgage brokers in BC; is that correct?

7 A If you are -- yes, if that's what you're saying,
8 I agree with you, yeah.

9 Q And so throughout the report, particularly with
10 respect to this proposed provincial task force,
11 would agree with me this idea of a task force
12 would impact a number of regulatory bodies in
13 British Columbia?

14 A Again, it could be, and I'm not a person that
15 would be, you know, well informed on how to
16 create a unit of this complexity. There's other
17 people that are far more knowledgeable that
18 could assess this idea for validity and take it
19 for what it's worth.

20 Q That was going to my next question was whether
21 or not you would agree with me whether or not
22 individuals from these statutory bodies would
23 actually be better positioned to determine
24 whether or not such a task force would be
25 advisable or workable, for example. Would you

1 agree with that?

2 A Absolutely.

3 MS. CHEWKA: Those are my questions. Thank you so
4 much, Mr. Rudnicki.

5 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Chewka.

6 I'll now call on Mr. Usher, who has been
7 allocated five minutes.

8 MR. USHER: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. Perhaps
9 Madam Registrar could bring up exhibit 672 and
10 go to page 4 of that. Thank you, Madam
11 Registrar.

12 **EXAMINATION BY MR. USHER:**

13 Q I just have a couple questions, Mr. Rudnicki. I
14 note here in fact third line it says "the
15 publicly available BC court report 160560." I
16 take it that's a typographical error and that
17 really should read "160650." Is that correct?

18 A Correct.

19 Q Thank you. And on that particular matter that
20 was a foreclosure in regard to a West Vancouver
21 property; is that correct?

22 A Yes.

23 Q And did you -- you got a title search for that
24 and did you obtain copies of the multiple -- I
25 think there were in fact eight mortgages on that

1 property?

2 A Yes.

3 Q A couple questions out of your comments here.

4 You say, for example, that -- I'm quoting:

5 "Private lender were registering mortgages
6 possibly unaware that other lenders also
7 had registered mortgages."

8 Can you explain that a bit. Because title
9 searches, of course, do show registered
10 mortgages.

11 A Right. And that's why I used the word
12 "possible" is that I was -- I wasn't sure if
13 they did their due diligence before registering
14 a mortgage, so ...

15 Q And if I suggested to you that on all eight
16 mortgages there were lawyers and in one instance
17 a notary, but in all of the cases there were at
18 least one, and on six of the instances the
19 lender and borrower were separately represented
20 by lawyers?

21 A I'll take your word for that, yes.

22 Q Okay. And are you aware that on -- that many of
23 those mortgages, in fact just only two of
24 them -- or one not but six of the mortgages in
25 fact were *inter alia* mortgages where the

1 security covered more than one lot?

2 A Again, I didn't go into great detail to work out
3 the details in this matter. I just saw that
4 there was nearly -- I think it was close to
5 \$30 million worth of mortgages registered to a
6 \$6 million house and thought that was unusual.

7 Q Yes. I certainly agree. This is an odd matter.
8 But in fact the mortgages on those properties
9 were *inter alia*. The lots if you looked at all
10 of them covered in fact four properties and
11 which ultimately by my looking at sale documents
12 was sold for more than \$57 million.

13 A Okay.

14 Q Do you have any reason to doubt that, or ...

15 A No. Again, I didn't go into great detail to
16 research this observation. It sounds like you
17 did, which is great, and that's the type of work
18 that should be done when observations like this
19 are made.

20 Q Thank you. And finally you had an observation
21 about cash. I take it you're not suggesting --
22 in other words, you didn't have any evidence to
23 suggest that lawyers or notaries involved in
24 these -- and there was quite of number of
25 them -- acting for lenders and borrows that they

1 actually were dispensing cash in the form of
2 currency, in a sense paper money, not for
3 example cheques from trust accounts?

4 A I'm not aware of the type of funds that were
5 involved in these transactions. I did not look
6 into that.

7 MR. USHER: Okay. Thank you. That's all my
8 questions.

9 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Usher.

10 Mr. Westell on behalf of the Canadian Bar
11 Association and the Criminal Defence Advocacy
12 Society has been allocated five minutes.

13 MR. WESTELL: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. My
14 questions and concerns were ably handled by
15 Ms. Herbst, so I have no questions. Thank you.

16 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Westell. And
17 finally Mr. Stephens on behalf of BC Lottery
18 Corporation, who has been allocated 10 minutes.

19 MR. STEPHENS: Mr. Commissioner, we have no questions
20 for Mr. Rudnicki.

21 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you,
22 Mr. Stephens.

23 Anything arising, Ms. Chewka or Ms. Herbst?

24 MS. CHEWKA: No, Mr. Commissioner.

25 MS. HERBST: No, Mr. Commissioner. Thank you.

1 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Ms. Patel?

2 MS. PATEL: No, thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

3 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Rudnicki, for
4 taking the time to share your experience and
5 expertise with us. It has been helpful. And we
6 will -- you're now excused from further
7 testimony.

8 **(WITNESS EXCUSED)**

9 THE COMMISSIONER: I think, Ms. Patel, we're in a
10 position to adjourn until tomorrow at 9:30. Is
11 that correct?

12 MS. PATEL: That's correct.

13 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. We will do so.

14 THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now adjourned until
15 March 3rd, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. Thank you.

16 **(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 1:00 P.M. TO MARCH 3, 2021)**

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